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PROSECUTION IN 3-D 
KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT∗ 
Despite the multidimensional nature of the prosecutor’s work, legal 
scholars tend to offer a comparatively flat portrait of the profession, 
providing insight into two dimensions that shape the prosecutor’s 
performance.  Accounts in the first dimension look outward toward external 
institutions that bear on prosecutors’ case-handling decisions, such as 
judicial review or the legislative codes that define crimes and punishments.  
Sketches in the second dimension encourage us to look inward, toward the 
prosecutor’s individual conscience. 
In this Article we add depth to the existing portrait of prosecution by 
exploring a third dimension: the office structure and the professional 
identity it helps to produce or reinforce.  In addition to understanding the 
office’s explicit policies, new prosecutors must discover the unwritten 
social rules, norms, and language of the profession and of their particular 
offices.  These informal instructions do more than simply define how a 
prosecutor acts; they define who a prosecutor is.  Our theory of prosecution 
also explains how different dimensions of the role interact.  The structure of 
a prosecutor’s office helps determine and bolster the professional identity 
of the attorneys who work there; that identity, in turn, has the capacity to 
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powerfully shape the prosecutor’s outputs. 
To investigate this third dimension of criminal prosecution at the state 
level, we conducted semi-structured interviews with misdemeanor and drug 
prosecutors in three offices during the 2010 calendar year.  Our discussion 
here focuses on two particular features of office structure—the hierarchical 
shape of the organization’s workforce and the hiring preference for 
experience—to examine differences they can make in a prosecutor’s 
professional identity.  In particular, the prosecutor’s basic attitude toward 
autonomy (or, conversely, the team) produces ripple effects on her 
relationships with other lawyers and police and on the value she places on 
achieving consistency across cases.  By viewing prosecution through this 
lens, we hope to offer managers of prosecutors’ offices greater power to 
shape the work of their attorneys and to give the public deeper insight 
about the work done in its name in the criminal courts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The criminal prosecutor works in many different professional 
environments: in community meetings, in consultations with the police, in 
misdemeanor and felony courtrooms, in sentencing commission and 
legislative hearings, and in budget meetings.  The professional experiences 
of this courtroom actor extend far beyond the courthouse doors. 
Despite the multidimensional nature of the prosecutor’s work, many 
legal scholars paint a comparatively flat portrait of the profession, providing 
insight into two dimensions that shape the prosecutor’s performance.  
Accounts in the first dimension look outward toward external institutions 
that shape prosecutors’ case-handling decisions.  These external checks 
come from the legislative codes that define crimes and punishments, jury 
and judicial review of the evidence, and the ethics enforcers within the legal 
profession, among others.  When scholars assess prosecutorial behavior 
along this first dimension, they usually conclude that external institutions 
offer too much space for the prosecutor to roam and too little control over 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Sketches in the second dimension encourage us to look inward, toward 
the prosecutor’s individual conscience.  In these portrayals, the lawyers 
who work in the prosecutor’s office over the long haul are idealistic people, 
willing to accept a reduced salary for the opportunity to serve the public.  
Personal experience and morality guide them in prioritizing among crimes 
and in designing prosecution strategies to promote public safety.  This 
internal and individualized account, while true in some respects, offers little 
explanation for why prosecutors in some places seem to do the work 
differently than prosecutors in other places, and no guidance for chief 
prosecutors looking to improve results or the workplace environment in 
their offices. 
In this Article we add depth to the existing portrait of prosecution by 
exploring a third dimension: the office structure and the professional 
identity it helps to produce or reinforce.  Looking to institutional forces 
within the office itself can show us in greater detail how a prosecutor 
experiences her professional role and the rule-of-law implications of that 
role.1  This deeper look at prosecution examines more than just the contents 
 
1 Some of our earlier work began this inquiry into the effects of office structure on 
prosecutors, a topic suggested to us by the time each of us spent working in prosecutors’ 
offices.  For an exploration of the power of leaders in a prosecutor’s office to shift the 
practices of line prosecutors, even on a matter as integral to the job as the use of plea 
bargaining, see Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002).  For an account of policies concerning the enforcement of the 
range of statutory rape cases, see Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial 
Discretion, Privacy and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691 (2006).  
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of explicit office policies.  In addition to understanding the official policies, 
new prosecutors must discover the unwritten social rules, norms, and 
language of the profession and of their offices.  Newcomers learn these 
expectations informally, whether through lunchtime chats or through 
careful observation of how veterans behave and speak.  These informal 
instructions do more than simply define how a prosecutor acts; they define 
who a prosecutor is. 
Our theory of prosecution also explains how different dimensions of 
the role interact.  The structure of a prosecutor’s office helps determine or 
reinforce the professional identity of the attorneys who work there; that 
identity, we believe, has the capacity to powerfully shape the prosecutors’ 
outputs, including choices about charges, dispositions, and relationships 
with police.  
By invoking the concept of office structure, we refer not to the 
physical edifice in which the prosecutor’s office sits.2  Instead, we have the 
social architecture of the workplace in mind: those alignments and routines 
inside the workspace that organize the staff to handle its caseload.  When 
the chief prosecutor decides whom to hire, how much to pay them, how to 
divide the work, how to train newcomers, how to monitor the work, and 
how to respond when staff prosecutors exercise poor judgment, attorneys 
learn from these choices what it means to be a good prosecutor. 
In an effort to investigate this third dimension of criminal prosecution 
at the state level,3 we carried out fieldwork in two metropolitan areas in the 
Southeast during the 2010 calendar year.  We conducted 121 semi-
structured interviews with line prosecutors and supervisors in locations that 
we call the Metro County District Attorney’s Office, the Midway County 
Solicitor General’s Office, and the Ring County District Attorney’s Office.  
In this first Article in a forthcoming series, we concentrate on a subset of 
forty-two interviews—those of the misdemeanor prosecutors and the drug 
 
For a description of other scholarly inquiries into the influence of the office, see infra Part 
II.B. 
2 For works exploring the impact of physical space on human behavior in a legal context, 
see, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); CORNELIA 
VISMANN, FILES: LAW AND MEDIA TECHNOLOGY (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young trans., Stanford 
University Press 2008); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 
1039 (2002). 
3 Given the distinctive caseloads and professional environments of federal prosecutors, 
we concentrated on state prosecutors’ offices, where the great majority of criminal 
prosecutions happen.  For an insightful discussion of how structural issues can affect the 
decisionmaking of federal prosecutors, see Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the 
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Adminstrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 913–21 
(2009) (arguing that the investigation and adversarial functions in federal prosecution offices 
should be split between two distinct sets of employees, so as to make charging and trial 
decisions more objective). 
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prosecutors—because those attorneys perform comparable jobs in three 
different office environments and therefore illuminate the structural 
questions that concern us here.  Our work is theory-generating, allowing us 
to formulate and sharpen theories about the culture of prosecutors’ offices, 
the professional identities of those who work there, and the potential 
impacts of those professional identities on office outputs.4 
 What we heard in those interviews sometimes surprised us, and at 
other times confirmed familiar assumptions about the prosecutor’s work.  
Two particular features of office structure drew our attention: the flat or 
pyramidal shape of the organization’s workforce and the preference for 
hiring experienced attorneys or recent graduates into entry-level positions.  
These features of the office’s social architecture correlate with distinctive 
professional identities of the prosecutors who work there.  For example, 
attorneys who work in pyramidal offices and who are hired without 
experience (as in Metro County) tend to accept bureaucratic and group 
values.  A strong team spirit marks their professional identities.  On the 
other hand, attorneys in an office such as Midway County, characterized by 
a flatter structure and more experienced hires, display professional identities 
that are decidedly more independent; they feel no particular obligation to 
match their own outputs to the decisions of their peers or to the policies of 
their superiors.  These are autonomous, rule-defying prosecutors.  
Surprisingly, an attorney’s team-member-versus-autonomous-actor identity 
correlates more strongly with his office’s social architecture than with his 
gender or race. 
We also found that the prosecutor’s basic orientation toward autonomy 
or the team produced ripple effects on his relationships with other lawyers 
and police.  Attorneys with a more autonomous professional identity tended 
to report more interest in the work of prosecutors outside their own office; 
they also dealt with the police in a more self-assured way.  Lastly, our data 
suggest that a prosecutor’s professional identity might affect, or be reflected 
in, the outcomes she achieves in criminal cases and the consistency of those 
outcomes. 
The argument proceeds as follows.  After briefly reviewing the 
standard two dimensions of prosecutorial behavior in Part II.A, we turn in 
Part II.B to the third dimension of prosecution—office structure.  We 
introduce there our theory, which traces the connections between office 
 
4 As with other theory-generating work, a great deal of work remains to elaborate and 
test the theories we develop here.  Cf. Samuel Bloom, Socialization for the Physician’s Role: 
A Review of Some Contributions of Research to Theory, in BECOMING A PHYSICIAN: 
DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES AND ATTITUDES IN MEDICINE 3 (Eileen Shapiro & Leah 
Lowenstein eds., 1979); Ester Carolina Apesoa-Varano, Educated Caring: The Emergence 
of Professional Identity Among Nurses, 30 QUALITATIVE SOC. 249 (2007). 
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structure, professional identity, and prosecutor outcomes.  Part III describes 
our research methodology, as well as the three research sites for this study.  
In Part IV we present qualitative evidence from our research sites to support 
our hypothesis about the relationship between office shape and hiring 
preference and the professional identities of prosecutors.  Part V considers 
the potential effects of the prosecutor’s self-identity on the output of the 
office. 
By viewing prosecution through the lenses of social architecture and 
professional identity, we hope to make managers of prosecutors’ offices 
more effective in shaping the work of their attorneys.  Our analysis also 
gives journalists, academic commentators, and other observers a basis for 
evaluating prosecutors in systemic and policy terms, rather than second-
guessing prosecution choices in particular cases.  Ultimately, an 
appreciation of the effects of office structure can give the voting public 
deeper insight about the work done in its name in the criminal courts. 
The effects of the third dimension are sometimes difficult to notice, 
particularly for legally trained observers who tend to look for explicit rules 
as behavioral guideposts.  This Article thus provides readers with a new 
way of seeing the state prosecutor.  It is not the only way: studies of 
external institutional constraints and individual prosecutor character also 
offer valuable insights about prosecutors.  We offer here (to invoke a 
famous metaphor) only one view of the Cathedral.  To fully understand the 
institution of criminal prosecution, “one must see them all.”5 
II. THREE DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
In an effort to understand the fascinating and multifarious work of 
criminal prosecutors, one could invoke several different perspectives, or 
units of analysis.  Much of the legal scholarship focuses on the external 
environment of the prosecutor’s office, tracing the interaction between the 
prosecutor’s office and various other legal institutions, including the 
judiciary, legislatures, sentencing commissions, and others.  The unit of 
analysis in this sort of work is a complete justice system, including all of its 
interlocking institutions.  In contrast, the professional-development 
perspective on criminal prosecution takes the individual prosecutor as the 
unit of analysis, looking inward to the moral responsibility of the line 
prosecutor for the wise use of discretion.  While external institutional 
relations and individual integrity offer two useful vantage points on the 
work of criminal prosecutors, there is a third possibility that receives 
surprisingly little attention: the effects that flow from the internal structure 
 
5 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 n.2 (1972). 
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of the prosecutor’s office. 
A. THE EXTERNAL AND INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PROSECUTION 
Prosecutors have broad powers, and one might measure that breadth by 
mapping the outer boundaries that various legal actors and institutions set 
for prosecutorial discretion.  Whether considered separately or together, 
those external institutions leave enormous room for prosecutors to shape 
criminal justice outcomes.6 
The first place to look for external regulations on prosecutorial 
behavior is the criminal code crafted by the state legislature.  Crime 
definitions and statutes authorizing penalties, however, tend over time to 
multiply—not restrain—the legal tools available to prosecutors.  Legislators 
amend criminal codes to cover more behavior, to increase the range of 
punishments that apply to criminal behavior, and to intensify the overlap 
among criminal code provisions.7 
Like the legislature, the judiciary usually does not temper the decisions 
of criminal prosecutors.8  When criminal defendants invite judges to 
override prosecutors’ choices about filing or dismissing charges, judges 
view those requests through the lens of the separation of powers doctrine.  
In that light, prosecutorial decisions appear to be quintessential executive 
choices.9  Applying the formal law of due process, the judge considers only 
 
6 For more complete reviews of the practical limits on strategies for control of prosecutor 
discretion, see ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR (2007); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009); Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, 
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005). 
7 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1276 (2005); Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: 
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641 
(2002); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005).  In settings where the criminal law regulates 
business practices or where the pool of potential criminal defendants is already well 
organized, legislatures do sometimes repeal criminal statutes.  See Darryl K. Brown, 
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007). 
8 Of course, judges can control prosecutorial behavior inside their courtrooms.  See, e.g., 
JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
CRIMINAL COURTS 21 (1977). 
9 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (explaining that when there 
are two overlapping firearms statutes with different penalty schemes, the Government may 
choose which one to include in the indictment).  As Judge Gerard Lynch famously phrased 
it, we now operate an “administrative” criminal justice system, where the important 
decisions typically happen in charging and plea negotiations, before the case ever makes it to 
trial.  Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2118 (1998). 
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whether the charges have some minimal factual support in the available 
evidence; there is no “least restrictive alternative” requirement.10 
While the willingness of legislatures and judges to shape the choices of 
prosecutors is muted, further potential checks might come from the voters 
who elect the chief prosecutor11 or from state bar authorities who license all 
prosecuting attorneys in the jurisdiction.12  Like the legislators and the 
judges, though, these institutions deliver less accountability for prosecutors 
than one might hope.  Prosecutorial elections are marked by heavy 
incumbency advantages and empty rhetoric, and meaningful disciplinary 
sanctions from bar authorities tend to be few and far between.13 
Taken together, these external institutions probably have some 
cumulative regulatory effects on prosecutors.  They help to ensure that 
prosecutors’ actions comply with the law and with current public priorities.  
They do not, however, fully explain why prosecutors act the way they do.  
To understand prosecutorial actions, we have to consider more than the 
breadth of the power granted to prosecutors by other legal actors. 
Some authors therefore have articulated a second dimension to 
prosecution, one that focuses on the individual prosecutor’s internal moral 
compass.  According to this account, when it comes to exercising judgment, 
an attorney’s conscience keeps her in line.  As an individual, and without 
prompting from others, she will behave responsibly despite the adversary 
pressures of her role.  “A prosecutor is expected to possess moral and 
ethical principles, integrity, and the courage to do the right thing.”14  The 
 
10 Judges, however, have reserved the right to overturn a prosecutorial decision in the 
rare case where a defendant stumbles upon proof that the decision was based on race, 
gender, or some other prohibited ground.  See Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) 
(stating that a prosecution may not be based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification”). 
11 See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 3 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor 
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 589–91 (2009) [hereinafter Prosecutor 
Elections]; Ronald F. Wright, Public Defender Elections and Popular Control over Criminal 
Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 803 (2010). 
12 Bar authorities bring few disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors, and light 
punishments are commonplace in the exceptional cases finding prosecutorial misconduct.  
See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 292 (2007); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of 
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 725–43 (2001).  The notable exception to this trend is the 
recent disbarring of Durham, North Carolina Prosecutor Mike Nifong, following his 
unsupported prosecution of three Duke University students for rape of an exotic dancer.  
Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, Former Duke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred, ABC 
NEWS (June 16, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3285862&page=1. 
13 See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 282–92; Wright, Prosecutor Elections, supra note 11, at 
591–606. 
14 Joseph Cassily, A Prosecutor Is a Lawyer with Convictions, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS 
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prosecutor “may strike hard blows” but “is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones.”15 
Such familiar quotes speak to the professional integrity of the 
prosecutor as an individual, and they may well characterize many of the 
professionals who hold this role.  Indeed, for many prosecutors, one’s 
personal background, training, and professional experiences help to form 
and ground this internal moral compass, providing stability and guidance 
over time.16 
But prosecutors—as professionals—are more than (or perhaps less 
than) the sum total of these individual traits and experiences.17  
Observations about the individual character of a prosecuting attorney do not 
address the institutional environment in which she works or acknowledge 
 
ASS’N MAG. Apr.–June 2009, at 4, 10. 
15 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  For a critique of the individualistic 
view of prosecutors underlying a recent Supreme Court decision, see Susan A. Bandes, The 
Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick 
v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011). 
16 A lawyer’s original ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic community has been found 
relevant to his place in the profession, see, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, 
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).  Political party preference, 
job experience, and gender have been found to be significantly related to attitudes about 
punishment and courthouse reputation.  ROY B. FLEMMING, PETER F. NARDULLI & JAMES 
EISENSTEIN, THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 
75 (1992) [hereinafter THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE].  Recent studies of lawyers have paid special 
attention to the development of connections to outsiders to gauge the depth and breadth of 
professional networks.  See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005); ROBERT L. NELSON ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND 
RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2009), available at 
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2.pdf;  John P. Heinz 
& Edward O. Laumann, The Constituencies of Elite Urban Lawyers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
441 (1997); Anthony Paik, John P. Heinz & Anne Southworth, Political Lawyers: The 
Structure of a National Network, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 892 (2011). 
17 See Howard S. Becker & James Carper, The Elements of Identification with an 
Occupation, 21 AM. SOC. REV. 341 (1956); Meryl Reis Louis, Surprise and Sense Making: 
What Newcomers Experience in Entering Unfamiliar Organizational Settings, 25 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 226 (1980).  The literature examining professional socialization has concentrated on 
newcomers to the medical profession and for-profit business executives.  For examples of 
the former, see DONALD LIGHT, The Moral Career of the Psychiatric Resident, in BECOMING 
PSYCHIATRISTS: THE PROFESSIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF SELF 241, 241–58 (1980); Apesoa-
Varano, supra note 4; Brenda L. Beagan, “Even If I Don’t Know What I’m Doing I Can 
Make It Look Like I Know What I’m Doing”: Becoming a Doctor in the 1990s, 38 CAN. REV. 
OF SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 275 (2001); Bloom, supra note 4.  For examples of studies in the 
for-profit business sector, see LINDA A. HILL, BECOMING A MANAGER: MASTERY OF A NEW 
IDENTITY (1992); Herminia Ibarra, Provisional Selves: Experimenting with Image and 
Identity in Professional Adaptation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 764, 769 (1999); Abraham Sagie & 
Jacob Weisberg, A Structural Analysis of Behavior in Work Situations Shared by Group 
Members, 130 J. PSYCHOL. 371 (1996). 
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the interplay between the pressures of this environment and her personal 
values.18  Like most professionals who work in organizations, prosecutors 
shape and filter their backgrounds to reinforce the professional image they 
want to achieve, in light of the expectations of the people around them.  In 
short, while the internal dimension may reveal some personal truths, it does 
not account for structural aspects of the profession or illuminate geographic 
or temporal trends. 
B. THE THIRD DIMENSION: THE INFLUENCE OF THE OFFICE 
The portrait of the prosecutor we find in the legal literature thus 
appears two-dimensional: not incorrect, but incomplete.  When deciding 
how to do their jobs, prosecutors do more than simply listen to their own 
consciences or respond to (or ignore) outside legal, environmental, or 
policy pressures.  They also work within the particular social architecture of 
their office and immerse themselves in attitudes about the job that come 
with membership in an organization.  For scholars interested in 
understanding why prosecutors think and behave the way they do, the office 
is an important but previously understudied third dimension of prosecution. 
Various organizational features of the prosecutor’s office—size of the 
workforce, status hierarchies, hiring strategies, job assignments, 
promotional ladders, access to the boss, and the like19—structure the 
professional identities and work lives of the attorneys in the office.  These 
aspects of the social architecture inside the office combine with aspects of 
the office’s external professional environment, such as the proximity to the 
 
18 Academics frequently adopt this perspective when praising the willingness of 
prosecutors to consider more than wins and losses at trial.  See David Luban, The 
Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2010).  Many published memoirs of state 
prosecutors affirm the role of individual conscience, but emphasize the challenges that tend 
to prevent prosecutors from following that guidance consistently.  See DAVID HEILBRONER, 
ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG D.A. (1990) (Manhattan); SARENA STRAUS, 
BRONX DA: TRUE STORIES FROM THE SEX CRIMES AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT (2006); 
JOHN SUTHERS, NO HIGHER CALLING, NO GREATER RESPONSIBILITY: A PROSECUTOR MAKES 
HIS CASE (2008) (Colorado). 
19 For example, others have documented the particular impact of specialized prosecution 
units on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, 
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a 
Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461 (2005); David C. Pyrooz et al., 
Gang-Related Homicide Charging Decisions: The Implementation of a Specialized 
Prosecution Unit in Los Angeles, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3 (2011), and on the inverse 
relationship between office size and rate of declination, see Michael Edmund O’Neill, 
Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive 
Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1447–48 (2004).  For a discussion of the general 
impact of combined prosecution functions on the objectivity of filing and plea-bargaining 
decisions, see Barkow, supra note 3. 
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courthouse, relationships with the defense bar, relationships with the 
judiciary, stability of courtroom personnel, and docket size and diversity, to 
produce the overall institutional environment. 
1. The Office as a Unit of Analysis in Prior Literature 
More than a generation ago a handful of socio-legal scholars set out to 
explain the influence of the prosecutor’s office on the individual 
prosecutor’s job.  More specifically, they looked for external relationships 
or environmental factors that might affect a prosecutor’s willingness to plea 
bargain.  For example, in her classic work Settling the Facts, Pamela Utz 
identified a number of institutional conditions responsible for producing 
variability in plea-bargaining rates in two California jurisdictions: Alameda 
County and San Diego County.20  She concluded that Alameda’s 
comparatively higher rates of negotiated pleas resulted from the interaction 
of legal institutions in that county, along with aspects of the broader 
political and social climates.  First, she pointed to the relatively strong 
public defense bar and the active role of the Alameda County judiciary in 
twisting arms to secure pleas in advance of trial.21  Second, she reported 
that Alameda had long suffered from high rates of violent crime, while San 
Diego had only recently experienced an upsurge in those crimes.22  San 
Diego also had a more conservative population than Alameda,23 which left 
the office leadership unwilling to appear soft on crime through negotiations 
with defendants.24 
A few years later Leonard Mellon, Joan Jacoby, and Marion Brewer 
studied ten jurisdictions across the United States, looking for structural 
features that “affect the uniformity, the quality, and the equality of justice 
administered by local prosecutors.”25  The authors concluded that in some 
 
20 PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL 
COURT (1978). 
21 See UTZ, supra note 20, at ch. 9; see also THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 24–
37 (arguing that chief prosecutors choose one of three political styles—courthouse insurgent, 
policy reformer, or office conservator—based on strategic concerns over their status vis-à-
vis the bench and the defense bar and personal views about the expected value of creating 
conflict by changing this status). 
22 See UTZ, supra note 20, at xi.  Utz also discussed the management styles of the office 
leadership—San Diego tightly supervised its deputies, while Alameda was more loosely 
organized and allowed its employees to exercise independent judgment—but these factors 
were peripheral to the question she intended to study.  The core question of her study was 
why one office allowed more discretion in case handling than the other.  Her insights about 
control from the top will, however, be useful to us in our discussion of internal structural 
features that influence professional identity. 
23 UTZ, supra note 20, at 43–44. 
24 Id. at 51–67. 
25 Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained 
1130 KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT [Vol. 102 
places, “the external environment imposes substantial limits on a 
prosecutor’s ability to act.”26  For example, they found that caseload size, 
prosecutors’ trust in the local police force, the demographic character of the 
jurisdiction, funding sources, and the values of the underlying community 
can all influence policies adopted by the prosecutor’s office.27 
These first-generation works catalogued the myriad ways that the 
external environment constrains or enables work in the prosecutor’s office.  
Because the prosecutor’s office is only one institution in a much larger 
community of socio-legal actors with competing interests, these external 
relationships bear heavily on the results that prosecutors tend to get with 
their discretionary power. 
Our theory of prosecution, like this earlier work, treats the office as an 
important unit of analysis, but we take the institutional insights in a 
different direction.  Rather than focusing on the extrinsic influences on 
prosecutorial decisionmaking, we suggest that internal features of the 
prosecutor’s office frame the professional identities of prosecutors in 
substantial ways.  By professional identities, we mean those “attributes, 
beliefs, values, motives, and experiences in terms of which people define 
themselves in a professional role.”28  Furthermore, while the earlier 
generation of studies sought direct connections between environmental 
features and case outputs, our theory proceeds in two stages rather than one.  
We do not leap directly from internal office characteristics to prosecutorial 
outputs.  We instead theorize that office features primarily affect or 
reinforce the professional identities of the prosecutors who work there; the 
influence of this identity might then be refracted, like light through a prism, 
to alter prosecutorial choices about plea bargaining, relationships with 
police and other attorneys, approaches to disclosure obligations, and the 
 
by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 52 (1981); see also JOAN E. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR’S CHARGING 
DECISION: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 2, 4 (1977).  All were large offices, but the sample 
contained regional diversity, including Detroit, Brooklyn, Miami, San Diego, Seattle, New 
Orleans, Gary, Salt Lake City, Norfolk, and Boulder.  Mellon et al., supra, at 52–53 n.1, 77 
n.58. 
26 Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 53. 
27 Id. at 60–65; see also JACOBY, supra note 25, at 2, 4.  For more recent work on the 
correlation between community poverty levels, community political conservatism, and 
prosecutorial dismissals, see Travis W. Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial 
Dismissals: A Multilevel Analysis of Case- and County-Level Factors, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 693 
(2010).  For recent work documenting the correlation between community demographics and 
prosecutorial willingness to file charges with mandatory minimum sentences, see Jeffrey T. 
Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 
44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427 (2007). 
28 Ibarra, supra note 17, at 765 (citing EDGAR H. SCHEIN, CAREER DYNAMICS: MATCHING 
INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS (1978)). 
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like.  In other words, the architectural features we discuss do not themselves 
cause prosecutors to handle cases a certain way.  Rather, they incline 
prosecutors to think of themselves and their professional role in a certain 
way, and this role orientation can motivate prosecutors to make certain 
professional decisions. 
In support of our hypothesis that structures within the prosecutor’s 
office matter to our understanding of the prosecutor’s job, we take seriously 
the insights of Roy Flemming, Peter Nardulli, and James Eisenstein, who 
first brought attention to the relationship between the organization of a 
prosecutor’s office and the political style of its leader.29  In their focus on 
more than just the work product of the organization’s employees, Flemming 
and his coauthors advocated for studies of criminal justice institutions that 
address more than the “bottom line” of outputs.  They warned that limiting 
research on criminal institutions to case outcomes “would be like limiting 
research on Congress to votes.”30  In other words, to understand fully an 
institution that operates through seemingly independent units, scholars must 
do more than simply observe and record the end products generated by the 
individual units.  When institutional fabric ties individuals together, what 
appear to be independent choices may in fact be decisions colored by 
institutional roles and expectations.  For that reason, the institutional fabric 
itself deserves study, separate and apart from the institutional outputs.  We 
wholeheartedly agree, and thus have designed a study of the prosecutor’s 
organization, as distinct from the outcomes that prosecutors produce. 
We part ways with Flemming and his coauthors when it comes to the 
significance of social architecture in a prosecutor’s office.  They treated 
office structure as a concrete embodiment of the chief prosecutor’s political 
style and personality.31  Because our concern is the professional identity of 
the workforce rather than of the boss, we are interested more in identifying 
the downstream effects of these structures than in tracing their sources. 
The connection between office structures and professional identity is 
not unique to criminal prosecutors; it is a common feature of professional 
life.  Coining the phrase “moral career” to describe the dialectical 
 
29 THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 37–38.  For Flemming and his co-authors, the 
structure of the prosecutor’s organization mostly reflects the political style of its leader as an 
insurgent, a reformer, or a conservator. 
30 PETER F. NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 368 (1988). 
31 We agree that these features may motivate the chief prosecutor’s choices when it 
comes to office structures, although the social architecture in an office also reflects 
exogenous features of the landscape that might override the leader’s personality.  Exogenous 
features—such as annual funding allocated by the county, the decision to split the handling 
of misdemeanors and felonies into two offices, or the views of career prosecutors in the 
office—may not vary with electoral outcomes or leadership styles. 
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relationship between one’s personal values and the interests or expectations 
of one’s professional community,32 sociologists have demonstrated in 
various settings that internal routines within an office can have a profound 
effect on the professional identities of the workers.33  Moreover, one’s 
professional identity is likely to change over time, particularly for 
professionals who make career transitions that require them to display new 
skills and attitudes as they adjust to new colleagues and new work 
environments.34 
Applying this insight to lawyers, the moral career (or professional 
identity) of the attorney results from the interplay between that attorney’s 
personal values and the professional environment in which he works.  The 
professional environment, which includes the office environment but 
extends further into the norms and practices of the legal profession itself, is 
thus one major driver of the attorney’s professional identity.  Studies of 
legal aid, criminal defense, and nonprofit lawyers, with their distinctive 
motivations and professional goals, provide vivid examples of this moral 
career unfolding.35  We offer here a close-up look at the moral career of the 
 
32 Erving Goffman, The Moral Career of the Mental Patient, in ASYLUMS 125, 169 
(1961); DONALD E. SUPER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CAREERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
VOCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1957); LIGHT, supra note 17, at 241–58. 
33 For example, studies of health-care professionals show how a person’s career “takes 
place in and is shaped by the structure” of the professional community.  LIGHT, supra note 
17, at 244.  The literature examining professional socialization is particularly well developed 
in the fields of medicine and business.  For examples of the former, see LIGHT, supra note 
17, Apesoa-Varano, supra note 4, and Beagan, supra note 17.  For examples in the for-profit 
business sector, see HILL, supra note 17, and Ibarra, supra note 17. 
34 See Nigel Nicholson, A Theory of Work Role Transitions, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 172 
(1984); Ibarra, supra note 17, at 765.  In the socialization process, people assume new roles 
and learn the appropriate “display rules” that accompany their new roles; they do so in order 
to assimilate into their new environment and eventually to internalize the proper identity, 
whether “custodial” (accepting of the status quo) or “innovative” (inclined to make changes). 
John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein, Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization, in 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 209, 228–29 (Barry M. Staw ed., 1979) 
(describing the difference between custodial orientation, content innovative orientation, and 
role innovative orientation as fostered by office culture); Robert Sutton, Maintaining Norms 
about Expressed Emotions: The Case of Bill Collectors, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 245 (1991). 
Otherwise, they risk losing effectiveness or authority.  See Mark R. Leary & Robin M. 
Kowalski, Impression Management: A Literature Review and Two-Component Model, 107 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 34, 38 (1990). 
35 For studies of lawyers who work with disadvantaged populations, see, e.g., Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the 
Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 33 (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold eds., 1998); Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical 
Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1195 (2005); Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short 
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state prosecutor, placing a spotlight on particular aspects of the office 
environment that might influence or reinforce the professional identities of 
the prosecutors who work there. 
2. Explicit Policies as Office Structures 
Which office structures correlate with the prosecutor’s professional 
identity?  A study of the third dimension of prosecution might naturally 
start with explicit policies, announced by the Elected36 or the chief 
assistant,37 that restrict the discretion of individual line prosecutors.38  Such 
policies exist in most places, at least as to certain crimes or certain 
courtroom issues.39  To be sure, bureaucratic life gives an employee plenty 
of ways to evade the commands of the boss.40  Nevertheless, it is 
 
Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1203 (2004); Marina Zaloznaya & Laura Beth Nielsen, Mechanisms and Consequences of 
Professional Marginality: The Case of Poverty Lawyers Revisited, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
919 (2011).  For a study of lawyers who work for politically conservative organizations, see 
ANNE SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT (2008); Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth & John 
P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 883 
(2007). 
36 Throughout this Article, we refer to the chief prosecutor of the office (the District 
Attorney or the Solicitor General) as “the Elected” because this is the term prosecutors 
commonly use to refer to their bosses. 
37 The chief assistant in a prosecutor’s office is akin to the chief operating officer of a 
corporation; she is the leader of the trial line attorneys, as well as the administrative 
decisionmaker on most day-to-day matters.  Her work in this regard frees up the Elected to 
focus on political duties or external relationships.  For the office to function well, she must 
be a highly trusted and loyal associate of the Elected.  See THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 
16, at 38. 
38 See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The 
Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 335 (1990) 
(describing the prevalence of internal office policies).  Note, though, that prosecutorial 
policies may be somewhat primitive; as Norman Abrams put it, “most often they amount to 
elementary instruction books for junior prosecutors . . . .”  Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: 
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 (1971). 
39 See Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and Organizational Strategies of American 
Prosecutors: Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 12 LAW & POL’Y 25, 26 (1990) 
(“Prosecutors, when compared to the other major actors in the courthouse, face few 
constraints in constructing offices that will follow their policies . . . Prosecutors have more 
freedom and less compunction in restricting the autonomy of their assistants.”).  The policies 
might also establish monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to learn about departures from 
the announced policies and to discourage them.  See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A 
Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 108 (1975) (“The characteristics of his work 
environment which greatly shape his own concept of the role he plays must include the 
nature of the organization which employs him, the methods used for the measurement of 
success, and his position in the judicial system.”). 
40 See AMITAI ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS 68–69 (Alex Inkles ed., 1964) 
1134 KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT [Vol. 102 
commonplace for a chief prosecutor to declare a policy on an important 
topic and to make the policy stick.41  Such formal bureaucratic controls are 
a routine part of the prosecutorial services in many other countries.42 
Yet explicit policies in state prosecutors’ offices form only a thin 
visible crust on a deep set of office structures that shape or reinforce 
attorney identity.  To understand why this is so, compare the shallow reach 
of a state prosecutor’s office policies to the deeper policies at work in other 
organizations that employ lawyers, such as administrative agencies or large 
private law firms.  Administrative agencies generate an enormous volume 
of internal directives for how employees should interpret and enforce 
agency rules, in order to regularize their employees’ behavior.43  The 
proliferation of these documents is likely a result of the enormous size of 
the agency staff and the funding and sophistication of the opposition.44  
These factors do not come into play for the typical state criminal 
prosecution. 
In the private law firm setting, the amount of client money at stake, the 
sophistication of negotiating or litigating counterparts, and the 
comparatively light caseload leads to closer supervision for junior attorneys 
than the typical state prosecutor’s office can provide for its new 
prosecutors.45  Unlike the decisions of a new prosecutor, any work product 
 
(proposing that because “a high percentage of the deviant acts are committed by a small 
percentage” of the participants, organizations should devote extensive resources to screening 
new recruits); THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 62–65 (describing how prosecutors 
work around policies they feel are too restrictive). 
41 The Elected can even force change on a significant issue, like plea bargaining, that is 
central to the daily work of the office.  See Mary P. Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating 
Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 
43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1080–83 (2006); Wright & Miller, supra note 1, at 57. 
42 See David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 
32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247 (1998) (comparing American and Japanese prosecutors in their 
emphasis on consistency).  See generally Kay Levine & Malcolm Feeley, Prosecution, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 12224 
(2001) (comparing various countries on the degree of discretion possessed by individual 
prosecutors in the bureaucracy). 
43 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 
(1992); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1446 (1992). 
44 See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper 
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 805–06 (2001) (describing 
reasons for development of detailed guidance at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
45 Some state prosecutors’ offices, including a few described to us in the course of this 
research, have crafted charging and sentencing grids to restrain individual prosecutors in 
their charging and plea offers.  But even in those offices, there is no parallel structure for 
supervisors to review letters written to victims, much less to sign off on motions or 
opposition briefs submitted to the court.  That scarcity of oversight would be unheard of in 
most law firms, who worry about the ways in which junior associates represent the firm’s 
2012] PROSECUTION IN 3-D 1135 
of a junior attorney at a large law firm receives multiple internal reviews 
before it goes out the door.46  The bare-bones funding available for state 
prosecutors and for their usual adversaries creates an environment different 
from the large law firm or the administrative agency.  The structural 
features of criminal justice work make formal policies less frequent, and 
less salient, for new prosecutors at the state level. 
3. Organizational Shape and Hiring Preference as Office Structures 
Given the scarcity of explicit instructions or direct oversight by the 
Elected or her chief assistant, our concept of the third dimension of 
prosecution must be more layered, accounting for unarticulated forces as 
well as explicit office policies.47  We could consider, among other things, 
how the leadership articulates the organization’s priorities,48 the provision 
of internal training opportunities, the size and diversity of the docket, the 
supervisory structure, the typical progression (if any) of assignments in the 
office, and the ways in which the physical layout divides or joins 
employees.49  While these are all rich topics, we highlight here50 two 
 
interests to outsiders.  We suspect this is at least partly the result of caseload size.  In many 
firms, junior associates work on a handful of matters at any given time; in contrast, the junior 
prosecutor is likely to have 75–100 cases on her desk. 
46 Moreover, the lawyers in private law firms devote considerable energy to the salary 
structures in the firm and insist on detailed and transparent monitoring and evaluation 
systems for the work of each attorney on the payroll.  See MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF 
LAWYERS REVISITED: TRANSFORMATION AND RESILIENCE IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF 
PRACTICE (2007) (comparing law firm cultures and emphasizing transparent compensation 
structures as a key determinant of office values); Elizabeth Chambliss, Measuring Law Firm 
Culture, 52 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1 (2010). 
The large size of the federal prosecutorial bureaucracy and the relative sophistication 
and funding available to at least some federal defendants also help to explain why that 
prosecutorial service is so different from the typical state prosecutor’s office and is subject to 
more well-developed written policies.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) also face 
discipline from a well-developed monitoring and enforcement operation within the 
Department of Justice.  E-mail from Jennifer Collins, former AUSA, to Kay Levine & 
Ronald Wright (Jan. 4, 2012, 4:51 PM EST) (on file with authors). 
47 See Felkenes, supra note 39 (providing an anecdotal account of the socialization of 
new prosecutors); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Use and Transformation of 
Formal Decision-Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines, Organizational Contexts, and 
Case Processing Strategies, 45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 262–65 (1998). 
48 See THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 25. 
49 Thomas Winfree Jr. and his coauthors, in their study of the socialization of law student 
interns in prosecutors’ offices, also examined structural aspects of the office, but they were 
concerned with those features that affected the interns’ experiences, such as the appointment 
of an intern supervisor and prosecutors’ willingness to give substantive assignments to law 
students.  See L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., et al., On Becoming a Prosecutor: Observations on 
the Organizational Socialization of Law Interns, 11 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 207 (1984). 
Those are not the features that concern us here. 
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features whose relationship to professional identity may seem less obvious: 
organizational shape and hiring preference. 
Shape: The “organizational shape” variable refers to the division of 
labor among line prosecutors in one office.  It is customary in the legal and 
sociological literature to treat hierarchical office structures and 
specialization among attorneys as the environmental norm for criminal 
prosecutors.51  This Weberian version52 of the prosecutor’s office is 
overinclusive and leads us to ignore important differences among offices.  
There are thousands of independent state prosecutors’ offices in the 
country, most of which contain only a few prosecutors in addition to the 
Elected.53  Given their small size, the opportunities for hierarchical 
supervision and specialization in most offices are severely limited.  Even 
among the midsize and larger prosecutor’s offices, we suspect one can find 
meaningful variety in organizational shape because the shape of each office 
reflects the unique combination of environmental forces and the personal 
priorities of the Elected. 
We see organizational shape as a variable that captures both the level 
 
50 In the discussion that follows in Part III, we discuss some of these other architectural 
features of each office as they become relevant. 
51 See, e.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN 
JAPAN 119 (2002) (“On the surface, organizations of prosecutors in Japan and in America 
may look much alike: they are bureaucratic; they distinguish between operator, manager, and 
executive roles; . . . they promote workers on the basis of some combination of merit and 
seniority . . .”); Jerald W. Cloyd, The Processing of Misdemeanor Drinking Drivers: The 
Bureaucratization of the Arrest, Prosecution, and Plea Bargaining Situations, 56 SOC. 
FORCES 385, 385 (1977) (observing, based on empirical research in San Diego, that 
prosecution has become “immersed in large bureaucratic structures that emphasize 
standardized procedures, specialization of activities, hierarchical decisionmaking, and the 
sanctity of written reports and records”);  Felkenes, supra note 39, at 115–16 (observing, 
based on surveys of prosecutors in California and Alabama, that the “office of the 
prosecuting attorney as an ideal bureaucratic structure is characterized by the hierarchy of 
authority, the complete elimination of personalized relationships, the high degree of 
specialization within the office, and the elimination of nonrational considerations such as 
hostility, anxiety, and affectual involvements”).  The only two contrary treatments we found 
in the literature (that is, studies that acknowledge the existence of alternative shapes) are THE 
CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 40–47, and Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 74–77. 
52 See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 329–41 
(A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947). 
53 Among the 2,344 felony state prosecutors’ offices in existence in 2005, half served 
jurisdictions containing fewer than 37,000 people, and more than 85% served populations of 
250,000 or less, what researchers regard as a “small” jurisdiction.  See PERRY, supra note 11, 
at 2; Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 1515, 1523 (2011).  Small offices typically have very small staffs; for example, in 
2001, offices serving populations of 250,000 or less averaged only three assistant 
prosecutors plus one elected DA.  CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 2 tbl.2 (2001). 
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of supervision and the specialization of assignments in an office.54  It runs 
from the flat to the gently hierarchical to the steeply pyramidal.  The flat 
office is marked by egalitarianism and the absence of specialization among 
the staff.55  The line attorneys in a flat office are subordinate to the Elected 
(and possibly to a chief assistant) but are essentially coequals to each other.  
They do not work under midlevel supervisors; they do not jockey for 
promotions because there are no promotional ladders for them to climb.  
Where specialized units exist, they are nothing more than alternative 
assignments, without conveying any sense of “moving up” in the office.  
Any articulated office policies tend to apply to the entire office, rather than 
to subgroups.  
While egalitarianism and generalization are the hallmarks of the flat 
office, pyramidal offices show high levels of hierarchy and specialization.56  
When it comes to hierarchy among the prosecutors in such offices, the most 
steeply pyramidal offices use several levels of supervision, including close 
monitoring at the unit level and culminating with the Elected and his chief 
assistant at the very top.  The attorney assignments in the most pyramidal 
offices also reinforce the hierarchy.  Seriousness of crime and prestige of 
assignment increase the higher up the pyramid one goes.  Line attorneys at 
the lowest level of the pyramid have the least experience in the office and 
consequently receive the least desirable (and least risky) assignments; they 
are subject to at least one level of review for decisions of any consequence.  
Each attorney earns more plum jobs and more freedom from surveillance 
through success in the office over time.  
With regard to specialization, designated groups of prosecutors handle 
certain types of cases (misdemeanors, drugs, and so forth) or certain phases 
of the adjudicatory process (such as screening, preliminary hearings, and 
trials).  Specialization allows the attorneys to develop relationships with 
defense attorneys and police who regularly handle those sorts of cases.  
 
54 We do not believe that this property is an exclusive function of the office docket.  
While offices with mixed (felony and misdemeanor) caseloads may be more inclined toward 
hierarchy, offices with homogeneous caseloads might fall anywhere on the shape axis.  That 
is, an office that exclusively handles misdemeanors might be flat or might be hierarchical, 
depending on the preference and leadership style of the Elected.  See THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 16, at 39. 
55 This is akin to the “clan” office described by Flemming and his colleagues and the 
“unit” style office described by Mellon and his colleagues.  THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 16, at 45; Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 74. 
56 This organizational configuration calls to mind Max Weber’s rational legal 
bureaucratic structure, which emphasized “division of labor, centralized hierarchical 
channels of communication and decisionmaking, impersonal utilitarian forms of interaction 
and a generalized respect for records and record-keeping.”  Cloyd, supra note 51, at 395 
(referencing MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1922)). 
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Moreover, team members can regularly share information about emerging 
defense tactics, enabling them to create a shared strategic response.57  A 
supervisor leads each group and develops group-specific policies to 
supplement the office-wide policies.  Team supervisors create a middle 
level of management for the office,58 although in smaller offices the Elected 
might personally supervise each of the specialty units. 
We hypothesize that the differences in office shape one finds among 
offices correlate with strikingly different professional identities and values 
among prosecutors.  An attorney working in an office subunit, distinguished 
by attorneys with similar skills assigned to handle similar assignments, will 
tend to look to her peers in that subunit, rather than to attorneys in other 
units with distinct responsibilities, for advice and role models.  Attorneys in 
this setting will treat prosecution as an exercise of group wisdom.  
Additionally, the prosecutor who is monitored by multiple levels of 
supervisors, who enforce a combination of team-specific and office-wide 
policies, is likely to be more comfortable with the burden of justification 
and accountability (those who are uncomfortable with these restrictions will 
likely seek work elsewhere).  In contrast, an attorney who works in a flat 
office is more likely to bristle at the possibility of horizontal and vertical 
controls on the exercise of her individual judgment. 
Hiring Preference: Turning to our second structural feature, an Elected 
must choose a hiring strategy for the office to keep the staff at full 
strength.59  Those hiring preferences could be based on alumni networks 
(e.g., for graduates of certain law schools) or on geography (e.g., for 
lawyers who grew up within the jurisdiction).  Here we focus on a 
particular kind of preference, for experience—that is, for entry-level 
applicants who possess prosecutorial experience at the time of hiring.  
Electeds on one end of this axis prefer to hire experienced prosecutors 
(veterans) whenever possible; Electeds on the other end recruit exclusively 
from the ranks of recent law school graduates (newbies). 
 
57 See Cloyd, supra note 51, at 395–96.  Whether the creation of a specialized unit 
actually affects filing decisions is up for debate.  See, e.g., Beichner & Spohn, supra note 19, 
at 490; Pyrooz et al., supra note 19, at 17. 
58 There may even be multiple levels of supervisors, as Bruce Frederick and Dan Stemen 
found in their study of the Midwestern County District Attorney’s Office.  See BRUCE 
FREDERICK & DAN STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DECISION-MAKING, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 5 (Grant No. 
2009-IJ-CX-0040 Sept. 2011) (describing an office with a three-tiered management system). 
59 Of course, what type of attorney an office hires is not driven exclusively by office 
policy.  There is some self-selection bias involved in who applies for the job in the first 
place.  In the succeeding pages, we describe some aspects of this selection and the ways it 
might limit the choices of an Elected when it comes to establishing the social architecture of 
her office. 
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There are costs associated with both approaches.  Veterans command 
larger salaries than newbies, but taking on newbies requires a commitment 
to train them and to endure months or years of underdeveloped judgment.  
There are also benefits associated with both approaches: veterans can “hit 
the ground running” when it comes to case management and courtroom 
technique, but newbies are easier to mold and may develop longer-term 
loyalty to the office, regarding themselves as home-grown talent who 
should repay the investment in their professional development.60 
We hypothesize that an office with a hiring preference for experience 
is more likely to employ prosecutors who think of themselves as self-
sufficient, who see relatively little reason to look to others in their current 
office for guidance, and who are relatively reluctant to accept close 
supervision from team leaders or others.  Offices stocked with newbies are 
more likely to employ prosecutors who are comfortable with, and perhaps 
even comforted by, multiple levels of control over their decisionmaking 
both horizontally (by peers) and vertically (by supervisors). 
Putting the pieces together, the two structural options we have 
described can be organized as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Interaction of Office Shape and Hiring 
 Preference for Experience 
In theory, an Elected might combine any particular point on the shape 
axis with any given preference on the experience axis, although leadership 
style, budgets, docket diversity, applicant-pool limitations, and other 
practical restraints make some combinations more likely than others to arise 
in certain places. 
 
60 See DOUGLAS T. HALL, CAREERS IN ORGANIZATIONS 48 (1976) (noting that a person’s 
career “stage” can influence his or her behavior at work; a professional in his first job “will 
probably be concerned about advancement and establishing a reputation among colleagues,” 
while an older person who started her career 20 years earlier is likely to have “quite a 
different set of concerns”). 
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For example, although the management style and personality of the 
Elected in even the smallest office might add some pyramidal elements to 
an otherwise flat structure,61 we suspect there is some correlation between 
large office size and pyramidal structure, even though the structure itself 
performs the critical role in our theory.  That is, given the inevitable 
specialization and levels of supervision that large organizations tend to 
require,62 we predict that larger prosecutors’ offices in the United States 
would be located in the upper half of Figure 1.63  Varied dockets may also 
push an office toward a more pyramidal shape.  An Elected with 
jurisdiction over both misdemeanors and felonies is more likely to require 
some specialization among the staff attorneys, and diverse caseloads will 
increase the benefits of specialized work and midlevel supervision to assure 
quality control.64 
There may also be a weak correlation between office shape and hiring 
preference.  For example, although some larger offices may have the funds 
to hire the occasional expensive veteran to perform a specialized training or 
supervisory role, we surmise that offices in the top right-hand corner of the 
graph (pyramid plus a preference for hiring veterans into entry-level 
positions) are few and far between at the state level.  An Elected who hires 
veterans into the bottom levels of a steeply pyramidal office can expect high 
turnover.65  Veterans are inclined to be “chiefs,” rather than “Indians,” to 
borrow an impolitic analogy from one of our interviewees.66  For that 
 
61 More active day-to-day supervision by the Elected in a smaller office, combined with 
more stable assignments to specialty areas, could push a smaller office up into the midrange 
of the pyramidal axis, even without a set of midlevel supervisors.  THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 16, at 39 (noting that even smaller offices can possess bureaucratic features 
because “bureaucracy evolve[s] out of political styles and their related policy needs as much 
as from the problems associated with increasing size”). 
62 See WEBER, supra note 52. 
63 This is consistent with the findings of Flemming and his colleagues in THE CRAFT OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 39 (“[T]he bigger offices . . . were centralized, hierarchical, and 
formally supervised.”). 
64 On the other hand, offices with less diverse dockets may need to adopt flatter shapes in 
order to promote attorney job satisfaction, particularly if the Elected has a hiring preference 
for experienced attorneys.  See Nicholson, supra note 34, at 178–79 (explaining that 
positions of high discretion keep employees from becoming unhappy and frustrated at work).  
We thank Darryl Brown for this insight. 
65 Given the pay and prestige associated with that position in a pyramid office, the job is 
not particularly attractive to attorneys who have gained experience and salary elsewhere.  
Even in the Manhattan DA’s office, regarded as one of the most prestigious state offices in 
the country, David Heilbroner was nearly the only member of his 50-person cohort who had 
taken the bar more than a few months before starting the job.  See HEILBRONER, supra note 
18, at 17. 
66 Prosecutor 955.  Trends at the federal level are of course completely different, given 
the prestige of the office itself, the emphasis on hiring experienced attorneys to handle the 
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reason, they may be more trouble than they are worth in organizations that 
value close control and consistent outcomes. 
Conversely, we believe that the features described in the lower-left-
hand corner of the graph (flat shape plus a preference for newbies) are 
commonly found in smaller rural prosecutors’ offices,67 which tend to offer 
lower pay and lighter caseloads than midsize or urban offices.68  New 
lawyers with lesser financial needs can earn a decent living there while 
gaining some experience.  Professional growth potential is limited, though: 
because rural jurisdictions have less varied and less serious crime than 
urban areas, fewer specialized prosecutors are needed and direct oversight 
by the Elected is common.69  With no need for midlevel supervisors or 
specialized units, the job becomes routine after a while for all but the most 
senior members of the staff. 
In sum, one previously understudied architectural feature that might 
correlate with prosecutorial identity is the degree of hierarchy and 
specialization, what we call the organizational shape.  Likewise, the 
tendency of an office to hire experienced prosecutors to fill entry-level staff 
positions, referred to above as a hiring preference for experience, may also 
affect or reinforce how prosecutors understand their professional roles.  
Pyramidal offices with a hiring preference for newbies, we believe, 
manifest an environment that encourages prosecutors to coordinate with one 
another and to think of their work as a joint enterprise.  In contrast, 
relatively flat offices that recruit mostly veterans are likely to attract and 
foster a greater sense of independence among the line staff.  In the 
following section, we describe our efforts to flesh out these insights through 
the use of qualitative interview data. 
 
federal docket, and the hierarchy structure imposed by the Department of Justice. 
67 It might also be found in military prosecutorial organizations (the JAG Corps).  As 
described to us by a former Navy JAG officer, most of the trial attorneys in the unit were 
newbies who would spend only two years in the office before moving on, while senior trial 
counsel provided advice and assistance.  Trial attorneys held substantial autonomy in case 
management, although pretrial agreements had to be approved by the convening authority. 
Interview with Mario Barnes, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of 
California at Irvine Law School, in Irvine, Cal. (Nov. 4, 2011). 
68 See PERRY, supra note 11.  Based on a nationwide dataset, the average budget of a 
small office, defined as serving 250,000 people or fewer, is approximately one-third the size 
of the average budget of a large office, defined as serving a population of 1 million or more.  
Id. at 4 tbl.4.  The caseload disparity is significantly greater: small offices annually close 
about 3% of the number of felony and misdemeanor cases closed by a large office.  Id. at 6 
tbl.8 (reporting median figures).  Of course, the median 141 prosecutors working in the large 
office can handle far more cases than the median three attorneys working in the small office. 
69 Many attorneys in our research sites indicated that they began their prosecutorial 
careers in one of these flat rural offices yet chose to move to a more urban and diverse 
environment after a couple of years to acquire more experience. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
We turn now to our preliminary empirical test of the variables that our 
theory of the third dimension predicts will correlate with the formation of a 
professional identity.  In this section we describe the methodology of this 
study.  We also provide background information on our three research 
locations and explain the shape and hiring preference characteristics of each 
one. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
In an effort to study state prosecutors’ professional development, we 
interviewed prosecutors in three offices in two metropolitan areas in the 
Southeast during the 2010 calendar year.70  The first office, the Metro 
County District Attorney’s Office (Metro), handles all felony and 
misdemeanor prosecutions for a major metropolitan area of more than one 
million residents.  The prosecutorial district includes major urban areas, 
suburban municipalities, and rural areas.71  Our two other offices are 
situated in another major metropolitan area: one midway between the urban 
center and the furthest reaches of the suburbs and the other a bit further 
outside the urban center in the suburban ring.  The Midway County 
Solicitor General’s Office (Midway) prosecutes only misdemeanors,72 
while the Ring County District Attorney’s Office (Ring) handles only cases 
filed as felonies.73 
We interviewed 121 attorneys in three offices, following a semi-
structured format that produced interviews lasting between sixty and ninety 
minutes in a majority of cases.74  Among the 11 narcotics prosecutors and 
 
70 We are now expanding this research into other regions of the country to assess whether 
the patterns we observed are generalizable beyond this region.  Since this Article went into 
production, we have completed approximately one hundred additional interviews at four 
other offices, including two in the American Southwest. 
71 Metro experienced rapid population growth in the first decade of this century, growing 
32% during this time.  Its population is roughly two-thirds Caucasian and one-third minority, 
most of whom are African-American.  The Metro County DA’s office employs roughly 80 
attorneys who file approximately 10,000 felony and 50,000 misdemeanor cases each year. 
72 The population in Midway in 2010 was about 700,000, with 54% African-American 
and 5% Asian residents.  The county grew about 4% between 2000 and 2010. The Midway 
Solicitor General’s office employs approximately 15 full-time attorneys (as well as two or 
three part-time attorneys); they file approximately 13,000 misdemeanor cases each year.  
The Midway District Attorney’s Office files approximately 5,000 felony indictments and 
accusations each year. 
73 The population in Ring in 2010 was approximately 700,000, with 25% African-
American and 5% Asian residents.  The population grew 13% between 2000 and 2010.  The 
Ring DA’s office employs approximately 35 attorneys and files between 4,500 and 5,000 
indictments and accusations each year. 
74 All of the interviews occurred in 2010.  The shortest interview lasted less than thirty 
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31 misdemeanor prosecutors whose interviews we analyze here, 26 worked 
in Metro, 14 in Midway, and 2 in Ring.75  Four of the prosecutors had 
formal supervisory responsibility for other attorneys in the office.  There 
were 22 females and 11 persons of color among these prosecutors.76 
Our interviews covered many aspects of the prosecutors’ educational 
and professional development.  For example, we asked our respondents 
about their reasons for becoming prosecutors, the influence of office 
policies on their day-to-day work, and their future career plans.  They 
described their relationships with supervisors, peers, defense counsel, and 
police, and discussed the relevance of law school, professional associations, 
and mentors on their current professional lives.  They discussed the tools 
and skills needed to do the job well and their philosophies of prosecution.77  
We coded the transcripts to identify common themes in the responses of the 
prosecutors and recurring patterns among subgroups.78 
This qualitative research method is well suited (and perhaps necessary) 
to explore our hypothesis that a prosecutor’s professional identity mediates 
between office structures and office outputs.  While quantitative research 
 
minutes; the longest covered more than four hours.  For a discussion of the semi-structured 
interview, a standard research method in the social sciences, see Beth L. Leech, Asking 
Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews, 35 POL. SCI. & POL. 665 (2002).  
Scholars recognize that interviews are a critical technique for grounded theory studies such 
as this one.  Normally at least twenty to thirty interviews are necessary for a scholar to 
develop a reliable model or theory that can adequately characterize the findings.  See, e.g., 
JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND RESEARCH DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG FIVE 
TRADITIONS 56 (1998). 
75 Our method, like most qualitative work based on interviews, emphasizes depth over 
numerosity in the dataset.  See Zaloznaya, supra note 35, at 924.  We recognize that two 
employees from Ring is a very small number on which to base claims about that office.  
However, because we are comparing structures, we were limited to practice groups that 
could be found in more than one site.  The only practice group in Ring that is duplicated in 
Metro is the drug unit.  We have been careful to check the sentiments about the office voiced 
by our Ring drug unit attorneys against the comments of their colleagues in other units to 
make sure that the drug unit attorneys are not idiosyncratic in their views of how the office 
functions. 
76 Midway employed a larger proportion of racial minorities than the other two offices: 7 
of the 14 attorneys interviewed there were non-Caucasian; 6 of those 7 were African-
American, and 1 was of Asian descent.  The 26 prosecutors in Metro were evenly divided 
between males and females, while 9 prosecutors in Midway were women.  The two Ring 
attorneys in the drug unit were male.  While we mention here the gender and race breakdown 
of the offices, we did not find any salient differences in result based on either of these 
variables. 
77 Our semi-structured interview questionnaire is available upon request. 
78 We used NVivo, a standard qualitative research software package, to facilitate this 
sorting of interview statements into thematic categories.  The software also facilitates word 
frequency searches and similar exercises to isolate connections among interviewees.  Each of 
us coded some interviews conducted at each of the three offices. 
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might capture something about office characteristics and case outcomes, 
qualitative methods offer more insight about the connective tissue of 
professional identity. 
B. SHAPE AND HIRING PREFERENCE IN OUR RESEARCH SITES 
Each of the three offices—Metro, Midway, and Ring—is characterized 
by a particular combination of shape and hiring preference.79  Metro is 
moderately pyramidal80 in shape and mostly hires newly minted lawyers 
right out of law school.  New hires start off in the misdemeanor unit, first 
doing bench trials before moving up to jury trials.81  After about two years, 
successful misdemeanor jury trial prosecutors graduate into one of three 
different units: the narcotics unit, the crimes against property unit, or the 
juvenile unit.  Prosecutors stay in this second assignment for about eighteen 
months; after that, they might make a lateral move to another second-stage 
unit or they might move up to crimes against persons or the habitual felon 
unit.82  The homicide unit is regarded as the pinnacle assignment.  A 
supervisor runs each unit or “team” and generates team policies to 
supplement office-wide standards.  Team supervisors serve as both channel 
and buffer between the levels; policies are communicated downward and 
problems are communicated upward through the team leaders to the Elected 
and the chief assistant, resulting in relatively little direct contact between 
the Elected and his line staff.83 
Midway, which prosecutes only misdemeanors, is located on the lower 
end of the shape axis and on the right end of the experience axis: all 
employees are coequal misdemeanor trial lawyers and all are veterans at the 
time of hiring.  In fact, the Solicitor General of Midway likes to brag to 
other officials that he has the most experienced misdemeanor staff in the 
state.84  There is one specialized unit for domestic violence, but the three 
 
79 The description here offers a structural snapshot of each office as it operated in 2010 
and does not account for organizational changes that have appeared since that time. 
80 We call Metro “moderately pyramidal” because there is only one layer of supervision 
between the line attorneys and the administration.  Steeply pyramidal offices, such as the 
Midwestern office studied by FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 58, boast multiple levels of 
supervisors. 
81 See Prosecutors 266, 272, 281. 
82 See Prosecutors 110, 236, 239. 
83 See Prosecutor 326 (when office adopts new policy, “usually, if – especially if it’s 
team specific, [attorneys will] hear from their supervisor”; if an attorney objects to an office 
policy, the Elected and chief assistant “hope the team supervisor can deal with it”).  
84 See Prosecutor 910 (“I think the general consensus is [the Midway Solicitor] tends to 
think that he needs to hire people with experience, like two years, three years, four years, 
five years experience, and depending on who you talk to, it’s either so he doesn’t have to be 
bothered with training them or answering a lot of stupid questions, or so he can go around 
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attorneys in that unit hold those spots more or less on a permanent basis.  
There is no midlevel supervision or policymaking.85  The line staff bundle 
together the chief assistant and the Elected as “the administration,” a unit 
they consider a breed apart from the trial line. 
Ring, which prosecutes only felonies, sits between the other two 
offices on both dimensions.  With regard to experience, most attorneys in 
the office are hired from other prosecutors’ offices; Ring occasionally hires 
newbies, but only those who were exceptional graduates of its internship 
program.86  With regard to structure, there are a handful of specialized 
assignments (narcotics, white collar, and so forth), but they do not serve as 
points of rotation or promotion.  The people currently staffing those jobs 
have held them for years, and expect to continue for years to come.87  While 
there are supervisors in charge of the specialized units and the line 
attorneys, they don’t supervise their teams much at all: they assist new hires 
with adjustment issues and serve as conduits for information from the 
Elected or as backups in case of emergency.88  In sum, Ring presents a 
shallower pyramid shape than Metro does.  Figure 2 captures the 
differences among our research sites.  
Figure 2 
Shape and Experience in Three Offices  
 
 
the state and talk about how he has the most experienced office.”). 
85 See Prosecutor 900 (remarking that she runs the domestic violence unit, but because 
that unit only handles a portion of the domestic violence cases that come into the office, its 
policies apply to the whole office, not just to the unit). 
86 See Prosecutor 775. 
87 None of the felony trial attorneys expressed a desire to move into the specialized units, 
although they deeply appreciate the work done by their colleagues in those units. 
88 One nominal supervisor in Ring describes the assignment like this: “[O]ur supervisors 
don’t supervise.  I mean, they don’t sit and look over our shoulders.  We’re professionals; 
you should be doing your job.  If they are in your office all that often, you’ve got bigger 
problems than whatever they’re in your office about.”  Prosecutor 785. 
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Having articulated two properties of the state prosecutor’s office and 
described their relevance to our three research locations, we turn in Part IV 
to the connections we observed between these structural office features and 
the professional identities of prosecutors who work there.  We pay 
particular attention to the prosecutor’s sense of autonomy as a 
decisionmaker.  In Part V we consider the second part of the theory: how 
structural features, operating through the prism of self-identity, might affect 
the prosecutor’s trade-off of values between consistency of decisions and 
individualization of treatment, as well as other outputs. 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE THIRD DIMENSION ON PROSECUTORS’ PROFESSIONAL 
ORIENTATION 
The structural variations among our research sites allow us to track the 
correlation between organizational shape, hiring preference, and 
prosecutors’ professional identities in two settings: misdemeanor units and 
drug units.  The moderately pyramid-shaped, newbie-oriented Metro office 
has both a discrete misdemeanor unit (located at the bottom of the pyramid 
and staffed mostly by newbies) and a discrete drug unit (located one level 
up).  Midway is a flat office that employs veterans to prosecute a steady diet 
of misdemeanors, while Ring is a gently pyramidal, veteran-oriented felony 
office that has a discrete drug unit.  In the discussion that follows, we 
compare comments of Metro misdemeanor prosecutors and felony drug 
prosecutors with comments of Midway misdemeanor prosecutors and Ring 
felony drug prosecutors. 
These comments first reveal that a prosecutor’s tendency to think of 
herself as either a member of an organization or an autonomous actor 
correlates with structural conditions of her office, including shape and 
hiring preference.  A prosecutor’s orientation on the question of autonomy 
also plays out in her relationships with teammates, supervisors, the whole 
office, and the larger legal profession. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTONOMOUS OR TEAM SPIRIT 
The sociology of organizations literature suggests that individuals 
respond in predictable ways to socialization forces on the job.  The three 
most common responses are rebellion (rejecting all organizational norms 
and values), creative individualism (accepting important norms and values 
but rejecting the less crucial ones), and conformity (accepting 
organizational norms and values uncritically).89  Our interviews with 
 
89 See HALL, supra note 60, at 71.  In this study, autonomous spirit correlates with 
individualism or rebellion, while team orientation correlates with conformity. 
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prosecutors reveal that an employee’s response to socialization forces is not 
entirely a matter of individual choice.  Instead, the office’s particular 
combination of shape plus hiring preference correlates with the degree of 
autonomy that the attorneys feel on both horizontal and vertical dimensions.  
By horizontal autonomy, we mean the degree of independence each 
prosecutor feels from his colleagues when it comes to making decisions on 
his own cases.  By vertical autonomy, we mean the degree of independence 
each prosecutor feels from his boss (or supervisor) when it comes to 
making decisions on his own cases.  Prosecutors who work in hierarchical, 
newbie-oriented offices will be inclined toward group values and low 
measures of autonomy on both scales; they internalize the perspective 
embedded in the Weberian bureaucratic model of the office90 and exhibit a 
“custodial orientation” that prizes the organization’s current values.91  In 
contrast, veteran attorneys in flatter offices exhibit high levels of horizontal 
autonomy and at least moderate levels of vertical autonomy; they conceive 
of themselves and each other as independent agents, more prone to 
individualism and resistance.92 
Our three offices exemplify these tendencies. In both the misdemeanor 
and drug unit context, Metro prosecutors see themselves as members of a 
single organization unified by group values under the office leadership; 
Ring and Midway prosecutors present as independent contractors who 
happen to work in the same office.  Metro prosecutors are less likely than 
their counterparts in Ring and Midway to acknowledge or to approve of 
resistance to office policies and are more deferential to supervisors.  In 
Metro, even the attorneys with more experience appear more amenable to 
professional value formation from the leadership. 
Turning now to specifics in our data, we begin with a thick description 
of Metro, the office most inclined toward hierarchy and specialization, 
staffed mostly by newbies.  We then discuss the opposite extreme, Midway, 
and save Ring for last, given its middle-of-the-road position on both 
structural variables. 
The team imagery emanating from Metro is palpable in the comments 
 
90 See WEBER, supra note 52. 
91 See Van Maanen & Schein, supra note 34, at 243 (opining that in organizations with 
hierarchical boundaries and “sequential socialization” (the premise that an employee must 
fulfill one role before passing to another), “custodial orientation” is more likely to result than 
innovation because recruits remain locked into the conforming demands of others in the 
organization for a long period of time). 
92 See Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 75.  A strong commitment to individualism may 
not be endemic to this form, though.  In the “clan” offices identified by Flemming and his 
colleagues, which were similarly marked by a lack of oversight and few official policies, 
attorneys worked with each other “horizontally” to “maintain some degree of consistency.”  
THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 45. 
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of our interviewees.  Whether junior, midlevel, or senior,93 male or female, 
Caucasian or non-Caucasian, the Metro prosecutors referred to themselves 
as members of teams and described their work lives and their social lives94 
as bound up with one another.95  They display very low levels of horizontal 
autonomy in their professional decisionmaking. 
The team identity is manifest in the physical movements of the normal 
workday.  The desks for all Metro misdemeanor attorneys are located in 
cubicles (not separate offices) on a single floor in the District Attorney’s 
Office.  They spend most of each day together across the street in the 
courthouse, coming and going at roughly the same time, while most felony 
attorneys spend at least two weeks out of every three working on pretrial 
matters in their own offices.96  In addition, all of the Metro misdemeanor 
attorneys start every workday together in one room, sorting files and going 
over cases and current issues.  They use these morning sessions to discuss, 
question, confirm, and otherwise monitor each other’s decisions in 
individual cases.  A misdemeanor prosecutor explained the reason for these 
discussions: “It’s important that teammates have faith in you.  And that they 
can know . . . you’re going to be in a position to do the work the correct 
way and . . . make the right decisions.”97 
Beyond having faith in each other, team members hope to become 
interchangeable with one another as a way to create stability and 
 
93 Among the 26 prosecutors on the Misdemeanor and Drug Teams in Metro, 9 had less 
than three years of experience in legal practice of any type at the time of the interview (our 
designation for a “junior” prosecutor, based on common attrition rates in prosecutors’ 
offices), 10 had between three and four years of experience in practice (“midlevel” 
prosecutors), and 7 had five years or more (“senior” level).  Of those 7 senior attorneys in 
Metro, 3 were supervisors.  Among the attorneys in Midway, 2 were junior, 3 were midlevel, 
and 9 were senior.  The 2 Ring drug prosecutors were both senior. 
94 The camaraderie that characterizes the work sphere in Metro spills over into the social 
sphere.  The misdemeanor lawyers get together at a local bar every Friday evening and often 
see each other on weekends and holidays.  Prosecutors 155, 191, 197, 308.  There is an 
annual team Christmas party hosted by the team supervisor, and the attorneys play softball 
together outside of work.  Prosecutors 272, 302.  Similarly, the Drug Team lawyers describe 
going to lunch together nearly every day and hanging out together after work; one even 
commented that team members see each other more than they see their spouses, so it’s a 
good thing they all get along.  Prosecutor 251. 
95 The peer group is commonly considered the employee’s main connection to the 
organization; it can provide “emotional support, coaching, and identification models to help 
the new recruit manage identity changes, difficult problems, and critical turning points.”  
HALL, supra note 60, at 80 (citing Douglas T. Hall, The Impact of Peer Interaction During 
an Academic Role Transition, 42 SOC. EDUC. 118 (1968), and Edgar H. Schein, 
Organizational Socialization and the Profession of Management, 9 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 1 
(1968)). 
96 See Prosecutor 134 (describing trial week, administrative week, and weeks in office). 
97 Prosecutor 170. 
2012] PROSECUTION IN 3-D 1149 
consistency in busy courtrooms marked by frequent staffing changes.  The 
Misdemeanor Team is organized on a horizontal prosecution basis, such 
that various attorneys will handle a single case at different stages of the 
proceeding.98  In addition to frequent prosecutor reassignments, there is no 
established roster of judges who staff the misdemeanor courtrooms.  Hence, 
ensuring that every prosecutor on the team will handle the case in the same 
way eliminates the risk of variation that might otherwise occur with judicial 
rotation or prosecutor rotation. 
I think we all kind of feed off one another and [want to know that] . . . every other 
person would do [the same] in the same situation.  If they were in our shoes, that they 
would also try this case, that they would also offer this plea deal. . . .  [T]here’s about 
20 of us on the misdemeanor team—and we all, I think we could all change rooms, in 
trial courtrooms, and all make the same decisions basically in the long run, and try the 
case to the same degree and skill.99 
The interchange among the attorneys on the team, each of whom 
brings a distinctive personal approach to the prosecutor’s work, also 
expands the perspectives of everyone involved, creating a “think tank” 
environment that “opens up a lot of thoughts . . . on how we should be 
working as a DA.”100 
More formal mechanisms to promote consistency and discourage 
horizontal autonomy operate in the Metro Drug Team.  First, because drug 
cases are handled horizontally, the team members “roundtable” every case 
to make sure every prosecutor knows the relevant facts and criminal history 
and could appear on any case if asked.101  As one drug prosecutor reports, 
 
98 Note that horizontal autonomy is a distinct concept from horizontal prosecution; the 
former refers to a prosecutor’s sense of independence from his colleagues when it comes to 
making decisions, while the latter refers to an office’s tendency to pass cases around 
between prosecutors at various stages.  For an explanation of the differences between 
horizontal prosecution and vertical prosecution, see Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1134 n.18, 1153 n.79 (2005).  The only units in Metro 
organized on a horizontal prosecution basis are Misdemeanors and Drugs, both of which 
exhibit low levels of horizontal autonomy.  There may thus be an inverse correlation 
between the level of horizontal autonomy prosecutors feel and the use of a horizontal 
prosecution model in the unit. 
99 Prosecutor 128. 
100 Id. (“I think when you get so many different ideals in a room together, and people 
start hashing out decisionmaking skills and why they are deciding on a case, you really get 
great input on how these other people think and how they would have decided something.  
Maybe [we] get the same conclusion, but [it is] done so in a different way to get there. And I 
think for us, that really opens up a lot of thoughts and kind of ideas on how we should be 
working as a DA.”); see also Prosecutor 251 (referring to Misdemeanor Team colleagues as 
the relevant source of new ideas and perspective: “Pretty much anybody on the 
Misdemeanor Team who I could talk to especially the first four months I was here, I wanted 
to learn from as many people as people [sic], get as many perspectives as possible.”). 
101 See Prosecutor 266. 
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“what the higher ups want is consistency . . . they want each team to be 
consistent among each other.”102  The Drug Team also stresses the 
importance of consistency by concentrating the “papering” decision (that is, 
whether to file a case in the first place) in the hands of just three attorneys, 
typically the most experienced on the team.103  Lastly, the Drug Team 
employs a detailed case-tracking computer program, giving the team 
supervisor rich information about the choices made by each line attorney.104  
These combined techniques of team “self-monitoring”105 make adherence to 
group norms a salient goal for each individual on the team.106 
“Structured assistance”107 for new prosecutors in Metro goes beyond 
just team norms and expectations.  Policies and rules, promulgated by the 
team supervisors and the Elected, simultaneously discourage both 
horizontal autonomy and vertical autonomy.  For example, new Metro 
prosecutors receive a forty-page manual, updated routinely, which sets forth 
guidelines for misdemeanor court behavior and “defaults” for case 
resolutions (that is, standard plea offers).108  Within this diverse group of 
office policies, a few amount to hard-and-fast rules, while others are more 
tentative.  Metro lawyers learn pretty quickly that there is no room for 
discretion when it comes to the hard-and-fast rules (e.g., DUI “refusal” 
cases must never be bargained down).109  Deviation will yield a reprimand 
and could ultimately lead to serious discipline, including loss of one’s job, 
 
102 Prosecutor 161; see also Prosecutor 203 (“It’s very much a teamwork approach, we 
make individual decisions but it’s very much, we try to be as consistent as we can.”); 
Prosecutor 125 (“Talking with my supervisor and the senior members of the team, it does 
change the decisions you make on the cases because you want to be consistent with everyone 
else on the team.”). 
103 Prosecutor 266. 
104 Id. 
105 Prosecutor 197.  This sort of team self-monitoring differs from the tight top-down 
control Utz found in the tightly pyramidal San Diego office.  See UTZ, supra note 20, at 47.  
This leads us to observe that hierarchical structure does not automatically generate 
hierarchical control to the exclusion of other forms of control. 
106 Deviation can be interpreted as a sign of laziness or lack of commitment, as 
evidenced by this comment from a drug prosecutor, in response to a question about whose 
opinion of his work matters: “My whole team.  I want to know that I’m pulling my weight. 
And, that if I am not, I want to be told, and if I’m not doing it the right way I want to be 
told.”  Prosecutor 110.  This comment was echoed by misdemeanor Prosecutor 188, in 
response to the same question: “My fellow ADAs, I really do care what they think because 
so much of their job is wrapped up in mine . . . if I’m doing something that is making things 
more difficult it makes their job hard . . . .” 
107 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 93 (1978).  Heumann notes that “[s]ince 
the newcomer’s actions reflect on the office as a whole, it is not surprising that this effort is 
made.” 
108 Prosecutor 272. 
109 Id. 
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although such punishment rarely becomes necessary.  When it comes to the 
looser rules, more flexibility is allowed as long as attorneys seek approval 
from the team supervisor in advance or offer a persuasive explanation after 
the fact.110 
Resistance to these policies is rare. When asked about employees’ 
reluctance to follow office policies, Metro prosecutors had a hard time 
remembering any examples, and most opined that no one in the office 
would disobey general policies or buck direct instructions.111  They told us 
that supervisors make themselves available to discuss employee questions 
about office policies, but at the end of the day, policies stand and attorneys 
must follow them out of respect for the organization.112  As explained by 
Prosecutor 302: “[W]hen you agree to work here, you agree to abide by the 
policies. And if you don’t like the policies . . . then you should probably 
seek employment elsewhere.” 
Attorneys on the Misdemeanor and Drug Teams also respond 
favorably to their supervisors because of their newbie status.  As one 
supervisor puts it, “[t]hey don’t have enough experience” to complain or to 
be attached to old ways of doing things.113  When Drug Team members 
start to speak up regularly and to voice contrary opinions, the supervisor 
tells them jokingly that it’s time for them to move out of her team and into 
Crimes Against Persons, the next level up the pyramid.114  Regular rotations 
upward thus ensure a steady stream of new recruits into the team, 
prosecutors who are excited to tackle a new challenge yet too naïve to resist 
leadership. 
Even though their autonomy is curbed by both team-level and office-
level structures, Metro prosecutors experience their office architecture as 
promoting sound discretion and professional growth.  They feel that their 
supervisors trust them to develop and exercise judgment, and they generally 
want to satisfy their bosses.  One misdemeanor prosecutor observed fondly 
that this was akin to a parent–child relationship, in which the line attorneys 
 
110 Prosecutor 188 (“A lot of the rules you can depart from in your discretion. . . .  You 
better have a damn good reason, but you can.”). 
111 Prosecutor 272 (“Very few folks coming into the office are going to say ‘I’m not 
going to do it.’ Nobody’s going to say they’re not going to do it.”). 
112 Prosecutor 239 (“Only thing I know is that outside the door, the door to this building 
doesn’t have my name on it. It has his. . . .  [You] make your arguments and you advise as 
best as possible.  But at a certain point, either I abide by the decisions that are made by a 
person whose name is on the door, or I quit.”). 
113 Interview with Supervising Attorney, Metro County, in Metro County (June 17, 
2010); see also Prosecutor 128 (describing the role of inexperience in suppressing 
independence and observing that “all the guys on the misdemeanor team feel young”). 
114 Interview with Supervising Attorney, Metro County, in Metro County (June 17, 
2010). 
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want to please their supervisor.115  Consistent with this portrayal, Metro line 
prosecutors were genuine and lavish in their praise of their team leaders and 
the Elected, whom most described as incredibly knowledgeable, “full of 
integrity,” and “proud of the work we do.”116 
If the Metro pyramid office manifests a strong esprit de corps and a 
high level of deference to respected authority, the opposite holds true in 
flat-topped, experience-laden Midway.  The Midway misdemeanor 
prosecutors regard themselves as independent contractors, each assigned a 
private roster of cases to charge and resolve as she sees fit.117  They also 
express a strong sense of independence from their boss, whom they regard 
as less experienced than themselves and detached from the day-to-day stress 
of the office’s caseload. In this environment, expressions of team imagery 
or deferential attitudes were few and far between.118 
The lack of conformity does not mean that Midway attorneys are 
alienated from each other.  To the contrary, they regularly chat with their 
colleagues about potential strategies and seek advice on thorny issues, and 
many experience this regular contact as a sense of camaraderie.119  But 
there is no framework, formal or otherwise,120 for the constant checking and 
cross-checking that goes on in Metro; self-monitoring by the office staff is 
simply not part of the job.121 
There seem to be two factors, beyond the flat office structure, that 
reinforce this heightened sense of horizontal autonomy at Midway: the 
stability of courtroom assignments and the prior experience level of the 
staff.122  The Midway judicial center houses seven misdemeanor 
 
115 Prosecutor 128. 
116 See, e.g., Prosecutor 152. 
117 This office resembles the “unit style” office described by Mellon et al., supra note 25, 
at 74–77, and the reactive clan office described by THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 
45. 
118 This finding proved equally true for attorneys of different races in the Midway office. 
119 Prosecutor 915. 
120 By some reports, there is an office manual for charging and bargaining that older 
generations sometimes pass on to younger generations; it is not provided by the 
administration at the time of hiring and no subject in Midway was able to locate his or her 
copy when we asked.  Even those who referred to the existence of the manual saw its terms 
as provisional, at best.  No one regarded it as anything other than a starting point for 
prosecutorial decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Prosecutor 905. 
121 To borrow a phrase from Mellon, Jacoby, and Brewer, “there was little integration of 
the staff into an ‘office’ . . . as each assistant operated his own policy-making unit.”  Mellon 
et al., supra note 25, at 75. 
122 There is also less cohesiveness based on social life compared to Metro.  The Midway 
prosecutors tend to be older and subject to more family responsibilities than the Metro 
prosecutors; they are eager to leave at the end of the workday to see their spouses and 
children, and they are far more likely to attend family or neighborhood events on the 
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courtrooms, each with its own permanently assigned judge.  “Each 
courtroom is its own universe,” says Prosecutor 930.  Two prosecutors staff 
each courtroom on a long-term basis, and they must learn and tolerate the 
whims of their particular judge to succeed in that environment.  These 
regularly assigned prosecutors follow their judge’s lead more than the lead 
of any colleagues in the office, treating consistency within each courtroom 
as a higher priority than consistency between courtrooms.123  Moreover, 
because many prosecutors came to Midway from other jurisdictions, they 
brought with them certain approaches (views of “what’s appropriate”124) 
that they learned elsewhere.  For example, one prosecutor who previously 
worked in another county in which banishment125 was a common term of 
probation imported that requirement into several of her plea deals in 
Midway.  While the defense attorneys complained about it, no one in the 
Midway office told her she should not negotiate for such conditions.126  
More generally, experience in other systems gives the Midway prosecutors 
a stabilizing sense of “the court system as a whole and a pragmatic model 
of the professional prosecutor.”127 
Just as the stability of courtroom assignments and prior experience 
render the Midway prosecutors horizontally independent of each other in 
important ways, those factors also reinforce their sense of vertical 
autonomy, or detachment from the administration.  In contrast to the Metro 
prosecutors, who spoke with admiration about their supervisors and the 
Elected, our Midway subjects frequently commented on the inexperience of 
the Solicitor General and his chief assistant.  Before the election, neither 
had prosecuted misdemeanors or supervised other prosecutors.128  After 
taking office, neither maintained an independent caseload or appeared in 
court except in unusual circumstances.  For this reason, the experienced line 
attorneys tend to discount the administration’s policies and instructions.129  
 
weekends than to socialize with coworkers. 
123 The lack of consistency between courtrooms with similar dockets led one of the 
Midway prosecutors to refer to the courtrooms as casinos.  Prosecutor 920. 
124 Prosecutor 955. 
125 This probation requirement prohibits the defendant from residing in the county during 
the period of probation. 
126 Prosecutor 945. 
127 UTZ, supra note 20, at 105; see also THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 45 
(describing the Elected of a reactive office as hiring people he trusted so that he would not 
have to “look over their shoulders” and signaling to assistants “that they were on their 
own”). 
128 Prosecutor 965. 
129 This situation embodies the bureaucratic dilemma of authority in the absence of 
expertise, first highlighted by Talcott Parsons in the introduction to his translation of Max 
Weber’s The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.  Talcott Parsons, Introduction: 
The Institutionalization of Authority, to MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
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In the words of Prosecutor 960, “[t]hey are too far removed from the 
gunfire . . . too comfortable in their offices with the air conditioning on” to 
give advice that makes sense. 
The line prosecutors’ experience of vertical autonomy also leads in 
some situations to outright resistance of office leadership.  As the Solicitor 
General settled into his post during the year after his election, the Midway 
line attorneys began to witness the slow encroachment of office policies 
onto what was otherwise a wide-open landscape, characterized by the 
original command, “Here are your cases, go forth and prosecute them.”130  
The Midway prosecutors experienced this gradual layering of office 
policies as an unwelcome intrusion on their previously unlimited discretion.  
As a result, resistance to these policies happens “all the time.”131  As 
Prosecutor 935 says, “There are a lot of rules, but people pick and choose 
which ones to follow.”  Nearly every person we interviewed in Midway 
admitted not just to knowing about the resistance techniques of others, but 
to personally using such techniques on a regular basis.132 
Compounding the general disregard for these rules is the near absence 
of consequence for violation.  Despite frequent threats that disobedience 
would lead to termination, not one subject could recall an attorney being 
fired for insubordination and most commented that the administration 
remained ignorant of all violations that did not produce publicity or defense 
attorney complaints.  Due to the absence of credible enforcement, there 
appear to be no general policies that the Midway line attorneys uniformly 
follow. 
In sum, the Midway office is the antithesis of the Weberian 
bureaucracy that scholars conventionally use to describe the prosecutor’s 
office.  This office instead presents an absence of hierarchy and 
specialization, and its veteran attorneys manifest a high degree of 
independence on both horizontal and vertical dimensions.133  Prosecutors 
express a strong desire (and a high level of confidence in their ability) to 
run their courtrooms without oversight from their officemates or boss. 
Interventions from the administrators are seen as ill-advised, inspiring line 
 
ORGANIZATION 59 n.4 (1947). 
130 Prosecutor 950. 
131 Prosecutor 920. 
132 Sometimes the resistance is overt (e.g., flatly ignoring an office rule about issuing 
witness subpoenas or doubling fines after appeal) and other times it is more hidden (e.g., 
using body language to signal to the judge and/or defense attorney the prosecutor’s 
disagreement with the office plea offer, so as to provoke the judge to reject the deal), but 
there is little doubt resistance is a regular feature of the office. 
133 This level of autonomy may be tolerated due to the relatively low stakes in the 
misdemeanor caseload and the relatively low visibility of the municipal court docket.  See 
UTZ, supra note 20, at 104 (describing low visibility decisionmaking in municipal court). 
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attorneys’ frequent conversations “about how to get around protocols, in 
order to make life workable.”134 
In Ring, experience blends with elements of a shallow pyramidal 
structure to encourage a hybrid of autonomy and team spirit.  The two drug 
prosecutors in Ring occupy adjacent offices, yet they don’t refer to 
themselves as a team.  They function instead like tenants in common, each 
managing his half of the caseload with a common goal in mind. Each has 
specialized in drug cases for about a decade, and they are two of the most 
experienced prosecutors in the Ring office. Both have a highly developed 
base of knowledge and both serve as instructors to police and other 
prosecutors regarding the law of search, seizure, and asset forfeiture.  In this 
two-person unit, one is officially the supervisor, but that supervisory status 
makes no apparent difference in how the prosecutors relate to each other or 
divide their work.135 
Although each Ring drug prosecutor is a self-sufficient senior attorney, 
the degree of autonomy we witnessed in Midway does not manifest itself in 
Ring, either horizontally or vertically.  Horizontally, a spirit of 
collaboration exists within the drug unit, the result of a deliberate choice.  
Years ago these two prosecutors decided that each should stay up-to-date on 
what was happening in the other’s cases, enabling either of them to take 
emergency phone calls from officers involved in clandestine 
investigations.136  Although they are not interchangeable to the same extent 
as the Metro attorneys, the drug prosecutors in Ring realize that the unit 
functions better if they share knowledge, and each treats the other as a 
sounding board. 
Vertically, the level of deference they exhibit toward the Elected is 
more reminiscent of Metro than Midway, despite the boss’s lack of prior 
experience as a felony prosecutor.  The Ring drug prosecutors consistently 
express deep respect for the DA’s position and for his hands-off approach 
to the office caseload.  For example, Prosecutor 785 says, “He’s a good 
boss—he trusts us and leaves us alone.”  Trust is essential because the core 
component of the prosecutor’s job is discretion: “I can teach a chimpanzee 
how to try a case.  You’re paying me for my discretion.  If you don’t trust 
 
134 Prosecutor 950.  Not one of our interviewees in Midway expressed any concern over 
or disapproval for the widespread disrespect for authority in this office.  Even the relatively 
junior attorneys just seemed to accept that as part of the office culture. 
135 To the extent that asymmetry exists in this unit, it seems to result from age disparity: 
the younger of the two goes out more frequently on middle-of-the-night raids and brings the 
older attorney up to speed on how to use technology for research and courtroom 
presentations.  Prosecutor 735. 
136 Prosecutor 735. 
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my discretion, then why hire me?”137  For Prosecutor 735, prosecution is a 
“structured business.”  Individual prosecutors certainly have autonomy 
within that structure, but they can’t “flaunt” it, because “ . . . you’ve got to 
remember [that] you work for the guy whose name’s on the door, at the end 
of the day . . . we’re soldiers in this army.”138 
The deferential posture slips a bit, though, when the Ring attorneys 
discuss quality-of-life issues.  Both men refer to their boss as a formal, 
starched-shirt person who insists too strongly on dress codes and early 
arrivals at the office every morning.139  They describe his physical removal 
from the rest of the prosecutors in an office “upstairs,” reaching out to them 
mostly by e-mail.140  But on the whole, they treat their boss’s formality and 
remoteness as a sign of trust, not a management problem. 
Reflecting on the comments of attorneys in all three offices about their 
professional roles, it seems that autonomy has two dimensions, which we 
might call objective and subjective.141  Objectively, a prosecutor’s actual 
level of autonomy is circumscribed by the structures imposed at both the 
office and the team levels.  Every office installs some of these basic 
structures—wooden beams in our architectural metaphor—but some offices 
supplement these basics with additional layers of review or protocols that 
further restrict attorney movement inside the space.  The number of these 
objective constraints, however, does not alone determine how employees 
understand their own independence on the job.  Prosecutors instead 
experience autonomy based on how salient these objective structures 
become in their day-to-day lives.  Moreover, the past experiences of an 
attorney set her expectations for the appropriate level of autonomy 
prosecutors should have.  Thus, for some attorneys working in some places, 
the architectural constraints become more visible, while for others they 
recede from view and become less important. 
 
137 Prosecutor 785. 
138 Prosecutor 735. 
139 The Elected seems to ignore the variety of roles line prosecutors must take on (e.g., 
dressing to execute a search warrant is not the same as dressing for a court appearance).  
Their boss does not just swing by one’s office to chat, and he does not organize or explicitly 
promote socializing among officemates.  They attribute this level of formality and 
remoteness to his rural background, his experience in the military, and his lack of personal 
familiarity with the drug unit’s daily pressures (e.g., the midnight raids and the 24/7 
availability to police). 
140 The drug attorneys noted that they have more access to the DA than other assistants 
due to his involvement in the multi-agency drug task force.  Prosecutor 785. 
141 See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 166–
72 (2008) (discussing objective and subjective views of prosecutorial discretion).  
Additionally, autonomy (or discretion) might be exercised differently at different points in a 
case; autonomy to file charges is not the same as autonomy to make plea offers or to offer 
diversion, for example. 
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In the Metro office, supervisors create team norms and habits that 
constrain prosecutors in meaningful ways.  Yet the newbie prosecutors feel 
trusted and able to exercise discretion as they learn to develop professional 
judgment.  They feel that supervisors give them room to make mistakes and 
give them input into office policies they don’t quite understand.  Their 
subjective perception suggests that the formal constraints, though 
numerous, are not onerous.  The Midway prosecutors objectively possess 
far more discretion than the Metro prosecutors.  There is no team 
consultation built into the daily routine, no standard manual to follow, no 
tradition of deference to the boss.  But subjectively, they experience each 
new office policy as an encroachment on their discretion, as a sign of 
distrust in their abilities.  The Ring prosecutors fall somewhere in between.  
They acknowledge that they work for an Elected who makes the large 
policy choices.  Most of the time, though, this element of control is hidden; 
they feel responsible for their own caseloads and expect the boss to contact 
them only about unusual problems. 
A prosecutor’s perception of her level of autonomy is not just 
symbolic, and not just about handling cases.  It can also shape how she 
views her place in the larger office and in the legal profession more 
generally.  In the remaining subsections of Part IV, we examine the 
connections between a prosecutor’s self-identity and these professional 
relationships. 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF CONNECTIONS TO THE LARGER OFFICE 
The structural features we have identified, and the degree of autonomy 
they suggest, can affect an attorney’s view of office functions beyond the 
attorney’s immediate assignment.  Pyramidal features in an office obscure 
the vision of line prosecutors about how the office operates, due to the 
barriers between levels.142  Attorneys in flat offices, with no teams to speak 
of and no midlevel supervisors between themselves and their Elected, have 
better access to the overall workings of their offices.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor’s level of experience can exacerbate the insular or transparent 
tendencies that the office shape creates.  Unsophisticated staff members 
tend to feel less confident than their more experienced colleagues when it 
comes to questioning superiors’ decisionmaking. 
The pyramidal shape of the Metro office, with its strong team 
associations and team-specific supervisors at each level, creates solid 
 
142 Van Maanen and Schein describe this phenomenon in organizations more generally.  
They contend that the more “included” a person is in the organization, the more that person 
will have access to organizational secrets, operational rhetoric (not just presentational 
rhetoric), and unofficial yet recognized norms of the organization.  See Van Maanen & 
Schein, supra note 34, at 222. 
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borders between hierarchical levels.  While those borders generate powerful 
team loyalty and affiliation, they also block the sight lines around the 
office, preventing attorneys from getting a good look at the work of others 
outside their team. 
The Metro attorneys profiled here experience both physical and 
psychological separation from colleagues working elsewhere in the office.  
Physically, the misdemeanor attorneys are removed from the felony 
attorneys both inside their own office space (creating a “huge separation” 
between the two groups)143 and in court, because misdemeanor attorneys 
work in the district court while felony attorneys try cases in the superior 
court.144  The psychological distance is evident when misdemeanor 
attorneys identify their teammates and their team supervisor as their sole 
sources of information about the job.  One prosecutor commented that, after 
nine months on the job, he didn’t even know the name of anyone in the 
office who was not one of his teammates!145 
This sense of separation is not unique to the misdemeanor crew.  The 
heavier workload for the Drug Team (compared to the other felony units) 
prevents those attorneys from joining others for lunch or other group 
activities.  They might even overlook the relationship between the drug 
docket and other felonies, a point brought home to one drug prosecutor 
when she attended homicide bond hearings one day: “When you’re on your 
team, you’re sucked into that world.  All I deal with is drug stuff, so I kind 
of forget [about] armed robberies.”146 
The team borders also shield the line attorneys from the Elected and 
the world he inhabits.  While the elected DA of Metro personally interviews 
every new hire—in a session that leaves a profound imprint on most of 
them, in terms of value transmission—he has only sporadic contact with his 
line staff after that point.  The attorneys feel his presence in the office 
 
143 Prosecutor 185. 
144 Prosecutor 236: 
I think maybe when I move to another team, like I would kind of have a farther reaching 
approach, like everybody knows district court is like a one to two year gig and everybody knows 
once one to two years ends, you are going to move to another team. So it’s not like I feel stuck 
there but you are just  . . . you are really involved in your district, like we don’t really see other 
people at the office, like we are almost always in court. 
145 Prosecutor 185.  Each new attorney arriving on the team is assigned a “trainer” for the 
first few months in misdemeanor court, and that trainer often has only a few months more 
experience than a newcomer.  That trainer’s advice is formative—second only to that of the 
team supervisor. 
146 Prosecutor 165.  The tendency towards introspection diminishes when prosecutors 
mix with outsiders: one interviewee emphasized that when Metro prosecutors attend 
statewide gatherings, attorneys from every branch of the office socialize together and are 
remarkably cohesive.  Prosecutor 272. 
2012] PROSECUTION IN 3-D 1159 
through repetition of his mantra, “Do the right thing,” but they rarely see 
him in court or in their offices.147  New office-wide policies stem from 
meetings between the Elected and the supervisors, and the supervisors 
communicate those policies downward to their respective teams in later 
team meetings.148  Supervisors explain the policy, take questions, and 
eventually assume enforcement responsibilities.  Likewise, if a line attorney 
has an issue, she will bring it to her supervisor, who will raise it with the 
DA. 
As a result of this buffer provided by the supervisors, Misdemeanor 
and Drug Team attorneys in Metro believe that the Elected operates in 
rarified air and is not connected to what they do on a daily basis.149  He 
deals with politics, the press, and other county officials.  But their distance 
from his handling of political issues seems to them a natural result of their 
junior status; new prosecutors feel unqualified to question realms beyond 
their experience.150 
As offices flatten out, the nearsightedness diminishes, at least on the 
horizontal dimension; there are fewer obstacles between attorneys to block 
one prosecutor’s view of what others are doing.  In Midway, for example, 
there are no definitional borders between line prosecutors.  Each of them 
plays on a level field with all the others—they all do essentially the same 
job, just in different courtrooms.151  Their offices are all located on the same 
floor, albeit on opposite sides of the main elevator, and office assignments 
appear to be random.  There is no clustering based on seniority, courtroom 
assignment, or any other variable.  Due to the similarity in job descriptions 
and close physical proximity, any attorney can consult with any other 
attorney for advice on how to handle a case.  One prosecutor mentioned that 
he talks to whoever happens to be around at 4:30 on a Friday afternoon,152 
although most express preferences for a small number of confidantes. 
Without midlevel supervisors to serve as buffers or conduits for 
information, the role of the administration becomes more apparent to the 
 
147 Appearances, when they happen, are memorable surprises.  Prosecutor 152 (recalling 
that when the Elected inquired about a new assignnment, the prosecutor reacted with 
pleasure and surprise: “But I appreciate it.  I was like, ‘Wow he knows what I’m doing.’”). 
148 Prosecutor 164; Prosecutor 272. 
149 Prosecutor 296 (“[A]t my level we’re kind of, kind of down the chain of command.  I 
don’t have a good idea a lot of times who’s making the decisions or where the 
decisionmaking authority is for a certain policy, and so forth.”). 
150 Prosecutor 188 put it like this: “I’ve been here less than a year. . . .  I don’t feel like I 
have the knowledge to tell a huge decision that affects the whole office, to be able to go and 
say, ‘You shouldn’t be doing this because of this.’  I just don’t have the expertise yet.” 
151 The only exceptions are the domestic violence attorneys and the one attorney who 
drafts complaints for all in-custody defendants. 
152 Prosecutor 915. 
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staff attorneys.  The Midway prosecutors see that their boss handles 
political and press issues, corresponds regularly with the public defender’s 
office and the local bench, and represents their office to county budget 
committees.  That is not to say they comprehend everything he does.  
Certain decisions—such as hiring new attorneys—remain shrouded in 
secrecy (much to the chagrin of the staff, who believe they should have 
input).153  More generally, the line prosecutors complain when they are the 
last to learn about policy changes, particularly when outside sources inform 
them about something that is about to happen in their own office.154  Unlike 
their counterparts in Metro, who accept that there are larger issues in the 
office about which they do not have enough knowledge to criticize their 
boss, the Midway prosecutors resent being excluded. 
The sense of removal, or “disconnect,”155 between the administration 
and staff also derives from physical separation in the office space that the 
Midway Elected created shortly after he became the Solicitor General.  He 
set the administrative offices apart from the line attorneys’ offices, and he 
began to require line attorneys to schedule appointments with his secretary 
to see him.  Based on their level of experience and familiarity with the job, 
the line attorneys in Midway regard these physical and temporal barriers as 
signs of the Elected’s egotism,156 not professionalism. 
Ring, which contains some pyramid features superimposed on an 
experienced staff, balances transparency and opacity at both the horizontal 
and vertical levels.  Horizontally, the line attorneys are experienced folks 
who (with the exception of those assigned to specialized units) all do the 
same job, albeit in different courtrooms.  Their offices are spread over two 
floors, and (again with the exception of the specialized units) office 
assignments randomly mix prosecutors with different backgrounds, 
experience levels, and courtroom assignments.  This allows attorneys to 
consult each other regularly for advice, although (as in Midway) each 
attorney seems to have developed a small cadre of particularly trusted 
associates. 
Contrasting with the open environment of the general courtroom 
attorneys, Ring’s specialized units have solid borders and resemble the 
Metro teams in terms of their self-referential quality.157  Members of a 
specialized unit share the unit’s total caseload, but each manages a defined 
portion of the cases.  This arrangement gives them regular reasons to raise 
 
153 See, e.g., Prosecutors 900, 910. 
154 Prosecutor 930. 
155 Prosecutor 905. 
156 Prosecutors 910, 960. 
157 They may be even more tightly controlled, given the long-term nature of the 
specialized assignments in Ring compared to the rotational nature in Metro. 
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case-specific questions with each other, both during informal hallway 
conversations and in occasional unit meetings.  While most unit attorneys 
also consult non-unit prosecutors for strategic advice, the work performed 
in each specialized unit remains somewhat hidden from the rest of the 
office, due to the distinctive skills the unit attorneys develop. 
Looking vertically, the line attorneys’ vision of the Ring Elected is 
somewhat limited, although not to the same extent as in Metro.  The Ring 
supervisors shield the boss from the regular headaches of the trial line and 
shield the trial line from the administrative or public relations concerns of 
the boss.  They meet periodically with the DA and interview prospective 
new hires.  The supervisors communicate office policies down to the line 
attorneys and encourage their attorneys to approach them before the Elected 
gets word of any problems.  Several years ago, when the line attorneys were 
ready to mutiny over the dress-code issue, supervisors arranged an office-
wide meeting and communicated these frustrations to the boss; when he 
relented, they shared the good news with the staff.158 
However, in contrast to their Metro counterparts, the Ring supervisors 
do not impose an additional layer of policymaking or guidance that the line 
attorneys must follow.  This sort of intervention is unnecessary, and would 
likely be unwelcome, given the experienced nature of the trial attorneys in 
the Ring DA’s office.159 
To sum up, the existence of intra-office borders—between teams and 
between the line staff and the administration—can foster a sense of 
nearsightedness that keeps the attorneys largely uninformed about their 
coworkers.  These internal divisions might appear natural and benign or 
needless and insulting, depending on the experience level of the prosecutors 
who notice them.  The breadth of awareness of other attorneys in an office 
helps determine the professional role models that a prosecutor chooses.  
The transparency and perceived legitimacy of the leadership in the eyes of 
line prosecutors influence whether the Elected and supervisors can shape 
the professional identity of the staff attorneys. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE LARGER 
LEGAL PROFESSION 
Professionals who work in private organizations must show some 
respect for their employers while remaining faithful to the external 
 
158 Prosecutor 785. 
159 Recall the comment: “We’re professionals; you should be doing your job.  If [the 
supervisors] are in your office all that often, you’ve got bigger problems than whatever 
they’re in your office about.”  Prosecutor 785. 
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standards and traditions of their professions.160  This problem of competing 
loyalties exists in the field of criminal justice, too: an attorney in a 
prosecutor’s office assumes the dual roles of employee and member of a 
larger profession, a duality that can influence both how she thinks of herself 
and how she exercises discretion in particular cases.161  Moreover, the 
structures in a prosecutor’s home office can create either fertile or rocky 
soil for professional values to bloom.  In some offices, the line prosecutors 
identify with attorneys who work elsewhere; in others, prosecutors think of 
themselves as members of a distinct profession, with no salient professional 
ties elsewhere in the legal field. 
The team orientation of the Metro misdemeanor attorneys—reinforced 
by solid borders within the office hierarchy—keeps prosecutors attuned to 
the views of their peers within the same unit, but it also leads them to show 
less interest in the views of legal professionals outside their office, whether 
they be prosecutors from other offices, defense lawyers practicing in the 
county’s criminal courts, or other members of the legal profession.  
Prosecutors in Midway and Ring, by contrast, more frequently cultivate 
professional ties with prosecutors in other offices, and they value outsider 
opinions about practicing in the criminal courts. The prior experiences and 
autonomous outlook of prosecutors in Midway and Ring lead them to 
identify more strongly with the prosecutorial profession as a whole. 
1. Prosecutors Elsewhere 
Members of the same profession typically share common training and 
values, allowing them to identify with other professionals even when they 
work in different organizations.  Defense attorneys, for instance, often build 
their professional identities around role models who are found outside their 
own offices.162  The development of ties between prosecutors in different 
 
160 See CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 44–46 (3d ed. 
1986) (describing the dual focus of scientists who hold jobs in bureaucratic organizations 
compared to those who hold academic positions at universities). 
161 See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 361–62 
(1953). 
A profession presupposes individuals free to pursue a learned art so as to make for the highest 
development of human powers.  The individual servant of a government exercising, under 
supervision of his official superiors, a calling managed by a government bureau can be no 
substitute for the scientist, the philosopher, the teacher, each freely applying his chosen field of 
learning and exercising his inventive faculties and trained imagination in his own way, not as a 
subordinate in an administrative hierarchy, not as a hired seeker for what he is told to find by his 
superiors, but as a free seeker for the truth for its own sake, impelled by the spirit of public 
service inculcated in his profession. 
Id. 
162 See Etienne, supra note 35, at 1209. 
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offices, however, seems to vary with the social architecture of their own 
offices. 
Hiring preference for experience seems particularly salient in this 
regard.  Few Metro prosecutors had prosecution experience before taking 
their current job,163 while eleven of sixteen Ring and Midway prosecutors 
previously worked full-time in another prosecutor’s office.164  Based on this 
history, prosecutors in Midway and Ring tended to invoke experiences in 
other offices when reflecting on their current status; reflections of this sort 
were a rarity in our interviews with Metro prosecutors. 
Some Ring and Midway prosecutors fondly spoke of mentors in other 
offices who contributed to their professional skills.  One misdemeanor 
prosecutor in Midway said: 
It wasn’t uncommon for us to be in trial and he would just be whispering in your ear, 
telling you what to do, and honestly . . . that’s where my training came from.  Because 
he knew his stuff, he knew his law, and he was always there telling you, even if you 
didn’t want to be told.165 
Likewise, Prosecutor 735, who worked in three offices before coming 
to Ring, told several stories about the first lawyers who trained him, noting 
that their professionalism and “zeal” for the job made him want to be a 
career prosecutor: 
I mean these guys all were career prosecutors and they were my mentors.  And I felt 
that because they did it, they never made a lot of money, they never dressed well, and 
they drove old cars.  I admired their career . . . and I sort of subconsciously emulated 
it.166 
 
163 Of the twenty-six Metro prosecutors working in the Misdemeanor and Drug Teams, 
only four previously had been employed full-time at another prosecutor’s office.  Another 
twelve interned with a prosecutor’s office during law school before taking the full-time job 
in Metro. 
164 For all but one of these remaining five, the job in the prosecutor’s office was not the 
first job out of law school.  Most had worked elsewhere in government (e.g., a public 
defender’s office, a state agency, a state judge’s chambers), and one had been a private 
defense attorney for more than 10 years. 
165 Prosecutor 900; see also Prosecutor 910 (“[T]hey ran a very clean and tight ship down 
there [in the office where I interned].  It was very fair, . . . everyone treated everyone else the 
same way.”); Prosecutor 925 (“Traffic court was . . . the time I was there was a time of 
transition, so it was a whole lot going on and my boss there was more concerned about me 
getting the experience I needed, versus anything else.  You know, he would come to me with 
a trial.”). 
166 Consider these additional comments:  
These guys were ADAs when I was there and they’re legends, you know, but they came to you 
and you could go to them, and they always had the time to talk to you and help you. . . .  That 
was always nice, that some of the guys, you know, had they been rude, had they been pricks to 
me, I don’t know if I ever would have stayed in the game. 
Prosecutor 735. 
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Aside from recalling specific role models, Ring and Midway attorneys 
offered comments about the organizational features of their prior offices 
that affected their work lives.  For example, a few recalled bosses from 
other offices who drafted all of the accusations, an approach that reduced 
the line prosecutor’s level of discretion167 but also freed up time for the line 
prosecutor to focus on preparing her cases for trial.168  Whether they 
evaluate their prior offices in a positive or negative light (or some mixture 
of the two),169 the point is that Midway and Ring attorneys generally have 
experience with prosecutors elsewhere, and this experience informs their 
perspectives on the contours and possibilities of the prosecutor’s role. 
Beyond the office’s approach to hiring, aspects of the larger 
institutional environment can influence a prosecutor’s connection to 
prosecutors elsewhere.  For example, consider the effect of bifurcation of 
the prosecution function.  Midway County and Ring County each have two 
prosecutorial offices led by different elected officials: one for felonies and 
one for misdemeanors.  In contrast, a unitary Metro prosecutor’s office 
handles all felonies and misdemeanors for the jurisdiction.  The bifurcated 
approach seems to facilitate and inspire more awareness of and respect for 
prosecutors in other offices, because the felony office sometimes hires 
directly from the misdemeanor office.  Misdemeanor attorneys who want to 
make the leap upwards therefore need to develop a reputation with assistant 
district attorneys they meet in the courthouse, while assistant district 
attorneys need to stay aware of the up-and-comers in the misdemeanor 
office.  In a unitary system, there are no other local-area state prosecutors 
whom one should either impress or learn about. 
This structural arrangement also produces a disparity in office size.  
Unitary offices may be significantly larger than bifurcated offices because 
they need to handle both portions of the criminal caseload.  Size is regarded 
as a significant benefit in Metro, as prosecutors there were inclined to think 
of themselves as a resource for other, smaller offices, not as a recipient of 
services.  But the suggestion that size equals professional prowess is not 
supported by our data from Ring.  The Ring DA’s office has a very strong 
reputation, even though it is not the largest district attorney’s office in the 
state.  For example, Ring attorneys are often asked to teach at statewide 
seminars and to lead workshops for prosecutors, and attorneys across the 
 
167 Prosecutor 905 (“[T]here were certainly standards there because they were all his 
standards.”). 
168 Prosecutor 960. 
169 See, e.g., Prosecutor 955 (“I think that at X county, we had a number of policies and 
things we could do, and things we couldn’t do. . . . [W]e had more layers of supervision 
there, so they communicated verbally a lot more. I think, quite frankly . . . we probably 
feared [the District Attorney of X County] more than we fear [the Solicitor General here].”). 
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state flood the office with resumes when openings are posted on the 
statewide website.  Yet Ring attorneys see value in developing cross-county 
relationships and in asking for advice from prosecutors elsewhere.170 
Metro prosecutors also correlated size with discretion, opining that 
they are permitted to exercise judgment more frequently than their 
counterparts in smaller jurisdictions.  One attorney summed up the 
relationship between size and judgment like this: 
[We] are the largest office in [the state], and in smaller counties . . . you have fewer 
cases, so the DA could make a decision about every speeding ticket that is over 95 
miles an hour, because there just are not that many. . . .  Here we are just too big to do 
that.171 
This correlation between size and discretion does not hold across 
jurisdictions, though, as other research reveals large offices that impose 
much tighter controls on individual decisionmaking than is characteristic of 
Metro.172 
The divergent views in the three offices about the relevance of 
prosecutors elsewhere cannot easily be attributed to disparities in outside 
training opportunities.173  For example, all three offices operate in states 
where there is one annual, statewide conference for prosecutors.  Most 
prosecutors report that they attend this conference,174 and most of the 
regular attendees report that they receive valuable instruction, insight, or 
rejuvenation from these meetings.  But whereas the Metro attorneys who 
attend this conference form their own social group and don’t mingle with 
outsiders,175 Ring and Midway prosecutors report that they swap war stories 
during the conference with attorneys from other regions.  Moreover, several 
of the Ring prosecutors regularly teach at these statewide conferences (and 
at the national boot camp for prosecutors in South Carolina).  They 
therefore remain abreast of the good work done by prosecutors in other 
offices and express willingness to call on outsiders to serve as resources in 
 
170 Prosecutor 735. 
171 Prosecutor 272; see also Prosecutor 173; Prosecutor 197 (“[W]e have an amazing 
amount of discretion and there just really are not those rules.”). 
172 See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 58.  Our preliminary data from a Southwestern 
state are in accord. 
173 In all three offices, internal training opportunities were too sparse or infrequent to 
make an impression on any of our respondents.  However, we suspect that in offices with 
meaningful internal training programs, this would be an important component of the office’s 
social architecture. 
174 Midway, in fact, organized the first-ever solicitor general’s conference in the state the 
year before these interviews were conducted.  This conference was the brainchild of the 
Elected, as part of an effort to assume a leadership position among other solicitors general in 
the state. 
175 Prosecutor 272. 
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difficult or novel cases.176 
2. Other Attorneys 
While interviewees in our three offices differed regarding their 
knowledge about outside prosecutors, they all took a similar posture toward 
defense attorneys who practice alongside them and toward civil litigators 
and transactional attorneys.  For prosecutors in each of the offices, defense 
attorneys help define their professional roles through either negative 
example or cooperation in moving cases along.  Civil attorneys exert next to 
zero influence on the work or professional identities of prosecutors. 
At first blush, prosecutors in Metro, Midway, and Ring seem to 
minimize the importance of the defense bar’s opinion about the quality of 
their work, saying that “[they] don’t think it matters as much” as the 
opinion of judges or other prosecutors.177  In fact, the training for Metro 
newcomers emphasizes that the good opinion of defense attorneys is not 
necessary for professional self-esteem.178 
Yet most prosecutors admit that they want defense attorneys to see 
them as fair and prepared, rather than as aggressive or game-oriented.  
“[W]hen they have a case with me I want them to, and I think I do have this 
reputation, that [I’m] going to be fair.  ‘He’s going to fight, but he’s going 
to be fair.’”179  The emphasis on being perceived as fair and 
“straightforward”180 is partly a matter of ethics (in the words of Prosecutor 
735, “at the end of the day we’re all lawyers and we all should have the 
same ethics in the profession”), and partly a matter of common sense, 
because the caseload will not move otherwise.  “You get along with them 
so you can kind of get what you need and they do the same.”181 
As predicted by the literature on criminal court working groups,182 
 
176 Ring Prosecutor 735, for example, said if he were facing a difficult issue he wouldn’t 
hesitate to call the Prosecuting Attorney’s Council, the statewide professional organization 
for prosecutors, to get advice. 
177 Prosecutor 182; see also Prosecutor 152 (keeping defense at arms’ distance).  In 
accord, in response to the question whether “the opinion of defense attorneys matter[s] to 
you,” Prosecutor 128 said: “For me, no.  They might get mad or they might get angry, but it 
doesn’t bother me.” 
178 Prosecutor 272.  Similarly, in Midway, prosecutors tend to say that “the more 
comfortable I became with myself and the more I knew myself, the more I was okay with 
being, ‘Take it or leave it. We could try it, I don’t care.’”  Prosecutor 960. 
179 Prosecutor 955; see also Prosecutor 152 (“I’m well respected.  I guess the way that—I 
do care in a sense the way that they perceive me.  A lot of them perceive me as being fair. 
And that’s what I’ve always wanted.”). 
180 Prosecutor 965. 
181 Prosecutor 287. 
182 See JAMES EISENSTEIN, ROY B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF 
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prosecutors in all the jurisdictions place more stock in the opinion of 
defense attorneys who are repeat players in the local courts.  They attribute 
the most extreme and unwelcome forms of adversarial behavior to 
“outsiders”—those defense attorneys who normally pursue a civil litigation 
practice, are new to the practice, or are not familiar with the jurisdiction.183  
Prosecutors also generally distinguish between attorneys they respect and 
other defense attorneys: only the opinions of the former carry any weight.  
As one Midway attorney put it, “There are the defense attorneys that I think 
are idiots. I could care less whether they think I’m working hard or what, 
because I know what people are saying about them.”184 
Prosecutors in all three counties also share the sense that they have a 
responsibility to keep defense attorneys within the bounds of acceptable 
courtroom behavior.185  Prosecutors see the need for “education” as 
especially pronounced for defense attorneys who are new to the profession 
and to the jurisdiction: 
[We] know that we’re going to have to mold [the new defender in the courtroom] 
because he’s going to come in here, he’s going to be a firecracker, he’s going to want 
to try everything. . . .  [There] are just certain things that we’re kind of like, “Okay, if 
 
JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS 19–39 (1988) (describing the components of the 
courthouse community); EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 8; see also UTZ, supra note 20, at 
95 (describing the system in Alameda County where, because DAs and public defenders are 
permanently assigned to courtrooms, “they get to know each other [and] the judge . . . and 
learn what to expect as they work together” and observing that in this environment, 
“[f]ormalism, partisanship and ‘unreasonable’ claims tend to be discouraged . . .”). 
183 See, e.g., Prosecutor 910; Prosecutor 182 (“[T]here’s a lot of solo practitioners out 
there who are just figuring out things as they go along, which can make it a little difficult for 
prosecutors in the courtroom.”).  This is consistent with the literature about courtroom 
working groups.  See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 58–61 (distinguishing cooperative defense attorneys who are 
experienced enough to know that most cases need to be plea bargained and those 
inexperienced or uncooperative attorneys who slow things down by being excessively 
adversarial). 
 Some prosecutors observe that many defense attorneys qualify as insiders because of 
professional ties that go back as far as law school: “You know, a lot of us went to law school 
together, a lot of us started practicing law around the same time and you know, so if I wanted 
the defense attorney to say, ‘Hey, you know, she’s a good attorney,’ it’s only because that 
means we have that mutual respect for each other.”  Prosecutor 925.  See also comments by 
Prosecutor 955 that he has a number of friends in the defense bar and thus tries “to keep 
work at work and outside work outside work.” 
184 Prosecutor 905; see also Prosecutor 197; Prosecutor 236. 
185 Prosecutor 287.  A drug prosecutor in Ring (Prosecutor 785) noted that office policy 
requires a prosecuting attorney to attend every meeting between the police and a potential 
cooperating witness if the witness is represented by counsel because the defense attorney 
might “take advantage” of the officer and extract a promise that the officer has no authority 
to make. 
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you want to keep the judge happy, this is what you need to do.”186 
Across all three jurisdictions, prosecutors expressed a sense of 
responsibility to shape defense attorneys’ conduct, much as they might feel 
obliged to train new attorneys in their own offices.187 
In contrast to the defense bar regulars, civil attorneys exercise little 
influence in prosecutors’ minds.  The attorneys in Metro express frustration 
about the expensive dues they must pay to the county bar association, which 
offers no programming or services that they find relevant.188  Midway 
attorneys asserted that after court responsibilities, meetings with victims, 
and stacks of cases to charge, they had little time left over to attend 
lunchtime Bar meetings (even if they wanted to).189  Similarly, Ring 
attorneys express no interest in meeting civil attorneys.  Because the civil 
and criminal bar “don’t really cross that much,” prosecutors never practice 
against those attorneys and have no motivation to attend meetings or 
otherwise to connect with the broader bar.190  To be sure, attorneys newer to 
 
186 Prosecutor 965.  She additionally commented, “[H]e’s a rookie and he’s just enjoying 
himself in court at our expense.  We’re like, ‘It’s 4:30—are you still arguing?’”  This is 
consistent with the legal environment observed by Pamela Utz in California, where “the 
failure of negotiation is ordinarily more attributable to unreasonable, often inexperienced 
defense attorneys than to excessive prosecutorial demands.”  UTZ, supra note 20, at 117. 
187 See Prosecutor 900 (“When you’re new, as an attorney, because we are in an 
adversarial system, you think that you’re supposed to be mean and come with an attitude and 
come with, you know, this ‘I’m not going to agree with you,’ and that is totally the 
opposite. . . .  We teach them . . .  I talk to them first and then if they don’t get it, I take them 
to trial and as I say, I beat up on them, I show them.”).  When pressed, she admitted that 
“newer prosecutors, they probably come the same way, quite honestly.”  Id.  A similar point 
of view about new prosecutors was expressed in the other counties too.  See Midway 
Prosecutor 735 (“A lot of young prosecutors, and a lot of young defense lawyers, they really 
get ‘it’s us against them’ mentality, and I don’t think that’s healthy for our profession.  I 
think we need to be able to respect each other.”); Metro Prosecutor 287 (“I think a lot of 
people, particularly younger people when they start right in the DA’s office, they want to, 
they’re all fired up and they just think that, go to the wall with these people and you’re going 
to fight with them and hate each other.  That’s not the way it is.”). 
188 Prosecutor 239: 
Our interest, our mission, our charge is a lot different and very distinct from what everyone else 
does.  It’s kind of a small anecdote, but we had the [Metro] County Bar meeting the other day, 
and [Metro] County raised its bar dues from $150 to $225.  And compare that with bar dues in 
every other county.  This is ridiculous anyway, $150, but to raise it even more?  And we had 
probably four-fifths the office out there, just voting against it and being pretty vocal about it.  
And just effortlessly most of the members of the private bar just go like, whatever. . . .  It’s just 
so different that I have absolutely nothing—I have very little in common with most members of 
the County bar. 
189 See, e.g., Prosecutor 960. 
190 Prosecutor 735.  This prosecutor further noted that he did attend bar meetings and 
network with civil attorney colleagues earlier in his career when he was in civil practice. 
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the profession maintain social ties with friends from law school,191 and 
more experienced prosecutors know lawyers from previous jobs who now 
practice outside the criminal courts. In both cases, though, their opinions 
are rarely relevant to prosecutors as they think about how to do their jobs. 
3. Accounting for the Disparity 
Why do our respondents from different offices seem consistent in their 
attitudes toward defense attorneys and other members of the bar but vary in 
their attitudes toward outside prosecutors?  As the courtroom working 
group literature suggests, the presence of repeat players is one key variable 
in prosecutors’ relationships with other attorneys.192  Contacts with civil 
attorneys are just too infrequent to make a difference, and this holds across 
jurisdictions.  As for prosecutorial perspectives on the criminal defense bar, 
the comments of prosecutors focused on courtroom behavior of the 
advocates, an environment in which variations in prosecutor office structure 
may exert less influence.  Nonetheless, structural choices—particularly 
stability of assignments193—may play some role in generating variation 
between offices.  Permanent courtroom assignments lead prosecutors to 
develop stronger relationships with defense attorneys they see every day; 
rotating assignments do not foster these sorts of connections.  Looking 
outside the boundaries of the office itself, the structure of the jurisdiction’s 
defense bar would affect how often even permanently assigned courtroom 
prosecutors encounter specific defense attorneys.194 
When it comes to building ties with prosecutors from other 
jurisdictions, the training practices of the office can drive or limit the 
opportunities for junior prosecutors to meet their colleagues from other 
offices, on both a state and a national basis.  Offices that sponsor mostly in-
house trainings limit these opportunities, while offices that regularly send 
 
191 Prosecutor 155 said, “I have friends that I went to law school with, that I interact 
with.  But they don’t know—if you file liens for construction workers on property, we’re not 
going to come into contact with each other probably.”  In contrast, Prosecutor 735 was 
unusual in stating that he would call “friends outside the prosecution game” for advice 
because he trusts their judgment and sometimes doesn’t want people in the office to know 
that he’s struggling with an issue. 
192 See Skolnick, supra note 183.  Where prosecutors encounter other attorneys on a 
routine basis, they are more likely to make distinctions within the group and to account for 
and value the opinion of some repeat players as they make charging and disposition choices. 
193 Stability of courtroom assignments is not inherently related to either shape or hiring 
preference; it is a distinct feature of an office’s social architecture.  Future work should 
investigate the independent relationship, if any, between this architectural choice and 
professional identity. 
194 See generally UTZ, supra note 20 (finding that the poorly organized defense bar in 
San Diego was unable to exert significant pressure on the district attorney’s office). 
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their attorneys to large gatherings promote the development of professional 
networks.  Additionally, if the leadership in the office periodically mentions 
practices in other jurisdictions as relevant to addressing similar problems at 
home, connections to other prosecutors become more salient for everyone 
in the office. 
V. EFFECTS OF THE THIRD DIMENSION ON OFFICE OUTPUTS 
The previous section used qualitative data from our research sites to 
offer preliminary support for the first part of our central claim: that the 
social architecture of a prosecutor’s office can leave its mark on the 
professional identities of attorneys who work there.  We turn now to the 
second part of our theory, asking whether this identity, in turn, has the 
capacity to influence the results that an individual attorney will obtain in 
criminal cases and, by extension, the results that the entire office will 
achieve in the criminal docket for the jurisdiction.  In Subpart A, we 
address this question by focusing on consistency in handling cases.  We 
discuss what prosecutors in our research sites say about the importance of 
consistency in their offices, and then describe the limitations of this study 
when it comes to assessing data on this question.  In Subpart B, we turn to 
other outputs that might bear the imprint of an office’s social architecture 
and the professional identities of the attorneys who work there, including 
career vision, relationships with police, and a “culture of mercy.” 
A. CONSISTENCY IN CASE HANDLING 
The public expects the professionals who work in American criminal 
justice to pursue two contradictory aims: to treat in the same way every 
person who commits the same crime and to treat each suspect and each 
defendant as an individual.195  These paradoxical expectations—treat every 
person the same, except for those who should be treated differently—also 
shape our views about prosecutorial discretion.196  Not surprisingly, then, 
 
195 These twin impulses lead us to ask police officers to bring a sense of proportion to 
their work and to decline to arrest some suspects, even if probable cause would support 
charges, without showing favoritism.  See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
POLICE 135–41 (2008).  Similarly, we ask sentencing judges to avoid “disparity” in 
sentences, but only if that disparity is “unwarranted” in light of the individual circumstances 
of the case.  See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 121–26 (1998). 
196 See Felkenes, supra note 39, at 99 (“The work environment of the prosecutor places 
on him demands that are often ambiguous and conflicting.  The strains of maintaining public 
support and acting effectively in prosecuting suspects make this highly visible government 
position vulnerable to numerous compromises.”).  We note that in the Vera Institute study of 
two prosecutors’ offices (Midwestern and Southeastern), prosecutors offered a mixed 
portrayal of the value of consistency.  While in surveys they regularly highlighted the value 
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one theme that arose during our interviews was the need for consistency 
among different prosecutors who work in the same office.197 
While interviewees in all of our research locations raised this point, 
some attorneys gave a higher priority to consistency than others, and this 
variation seemed to correlate with their office environments.198  Line 
prosecutors in Metro, an office whose structures promote a strong team 
spirit, explained that they encourage each other to produce consistent 
outcomes in the cases they each handle.199  Conversely, prosecutors in our 
flat office stocked with veterans (Midway) placed value on individualized 
outcomes rather than on consistency.  Ring prosecutors fell somewhere in 
between. 
This correlation between social architecture and consistency is not 
surprising. In offices where attorneys conceive of themselves as team 
members who can substitute for each other whenever the need arises, the 
desire for interchangeable results is understandable.200  Offices that foster 
autonomy are less likely to place a premium on consistency of outcomes for 
several reasons.  First, a prosecutor who is not subject to regular cross-
checking by teammates or monitoring by a supervisor can reach her own 
conclusions about what is appropriate in her caseload, without having to 
account for her decisions to anyone other than the judge in the courtroom.  
Second, if she seeks advice about her cases, the absence of intra-office 
borders allows her to collect multiple and diverse opinions.  Through these 
contacts, she is likely to hear multiple different approaches from many 
people.  Third, an office that tends to hire veteran prosecutors increases the 
 
of consistency across cases, in focus groups they acknowledged that competing values and 
limited resources often make consistency hard to achieve.  FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 
58, at 9. 
197 Cf. Michael Tonry, Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
37 (2005) (treating consistency of outcomes as one of the “functions” of sentencing, as 
distinguished from the normative “purposes” to be achieved by criminal sentences). 
198 The findings of Mellon and his colleagues were in accord; across 10 cities, they found 
high levels of variation in the commitment to consistency.  See Mellon et al., supra note 25, 
at 77. 
199 Prosecutors in pyramidal, newbie-oriented Metro, for example, frequently commented 
about the importance of consistent outcomes in both the drug and misdemeanor caseloads.  
See, e.g., Prosecutor 251 (“[We] want to remain consistent as a whole because otherwise it 
looks like one person is off in the field, where everyone else is doing one thing and they’re 
doing the other. . . .  [So] there is a lot of, ‘Oh, what would you do he[re]?’ then you kind of 
come to a consensus together of what is appropriate sometimes.”); Prosecutor 128 (“[We] 
hold each other accountable for how we are going to try a case, and what’s a good case, and 
what’s a good decision in that case.”). 
200 We acknowledge that this theory may suffer from a chicken–egg problem; that is, it 
might be that Electeds who value consistency construct architectural features to support that 
value, while Electeds who value individualized justice make other architectural choices. 
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pluralism of the office’s discourse, assembling attorneys with different 
experiences and views about filing strategies, standard plea offers, and 
sentence recommendations.201  Thus, a flatter office structure combined 
with a veteran hiring preference gives attorneys access to a wider menu of 
legitimate options. 
But our interviews also reveal that the value a prosecutor’s office 
places on consistency or individualism is not uniform; it is instead layered 
and contextual, depending on source, timing, and audience.  For example, 
while an office’s social architecture might be built to emphasize either 
conformity or individualization, discourses within the office might stress 
the opposite value.  In Metro, for example, where the background daily 
routines and supervisory structures emphasize a team-based, conformist 
professional identity and the value of consistency, oral messages from the 
supervisors encourage employees to use individualized discretion.  In fact, 
the supervisor of the Misdemeanor Team explicitly says that his objective is 
to promote the confidence of new attorneys in their own judgment.202  
Moreover, the overarching office philosophy of the Elected in Metro—to 
“do the right thing” and to “do justice”—is taken to mean that a prosecutor 
should consider the case-specific interests (of the particular defendant, 
victim, and community) when crafting a sentencing recommendation.203  As 
Prosecutor 251 put it: 
I was told from the beginning we’re supposed to do what’s right.  Do not only what 
feels right but also just in practice, in seeing kind of what the norm is for certain 
offenses, . . . but also taking into account the full context of the situation to try to do 
what’s best for everybody involved if possible. 
Words of trust and support, in short, can counterbalance or mute the effects 
of the established architecture.204 
 
201 Consider, for example, the Midway prosecutor who introduced a completely new 
punishment—banishment—into the menu of punishments in the local courts based on her 
experience in another county.  Prosecutor 945.  Other prosecutors in the office treated her 
initiative as a curiosity, but not as a violation of office values.  That they chose not to 
emulate her initiative is not important—her point of view on the suitability of this probation 
term is simply one of many that coexist in the office. 
202 Interview with Supervising Attorney, Metro County, in Metro County (June 17, 
2010). 
203 The newbie attorneys on the team believe that their supervisors ultimately expect 
thoughtfulness from them, not merely compliance.  They view different rules as deserving of 
different levels of compliance.  
204 Likewise, distinctive aspects of the social architecture in an office otherwise marked 
by autonomy might impose “subtle pressure” on its line staff “to be in line with general 
averages and disposition rates”; that is, an office that exhibits “few outward controls” might 
have “a good deal of internal consistency” due to a high level of collegiality, small size, and 
use of a computer system to track case handling.  Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 76 
(describing Salt Lake City). 
2012] PROSECUTION IN 3-D 1173 
While messaging from leadership can alter the expected balance 
between consistency and individualization, the direction of the proposed 
movement, together with the timing and audience, affect how that message 
will be received.  First, the socialization literature suggests that moving the 
metaphorical office walls may be particularly difficult when the direction is 
from independence to conformity.205  This phenomenon arose in Midway, 
where the line attorneys resisted and resented their Elected’s efforts to 
impose more oversight after an initial laissez-faire approach.  With regard 
to timing, a shift in the preferred balance likely becomes more difficult the 
longer the initial blend of values remains in place. 
As for audience, the experience level of the office attorneys might also 
affect the success of a proposed recalibration.  New additions to the 
architecture will be highly visible to veteran attorneys happy with the 
original framing and experienced enough to know the difference.  On the 
other hand, newbies entering a well-established edifice for the first time 
(that is, when they join a smoothly running, highly structured office) take 
the structures for granted, treating them as permanent rather than transitory, 
a natural part of the professional landscape. 
In sum, the attorneys talk about the relative importance of consistency 
and individualized treatment of defendants, and their answers correlate with 
the office structures that surround them, but the correlations are not 
unidimensional.  We thus found ourselves wondering about actual behavior: 
do prosecutors produce results that reflect the values they espouse, the 
architecture within which they work, or some combination? 
Although logic suggests that more consistent case outcomes will 
appear in jurisdictions that are built to value consistency, we do not assume 
that strong consistency-oriented internal office features will, in and of 
themselves, produce consistent case outcomes.  There are several 
competing pressures. First, while an office might aim for consistency, 
actual case resolutions depend heavily on judicial and defense attorney 
responses to prosecutorial overtures;206 this is especially true in jurisdictions 
that assign judges and prosecutors to courtrooms on a more-or-less 
permanent basis.  If we want to compare across jurisdictions with differing 
courtroom rotation procedures, prosecutorial bail recommendations, 
diversion eligibility letters, and plea offers would trump case outcomes as 
proxies for an office’s commitment to consistency. 
Secondly, internal office structures interact with statewide features of 
 
205 See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 34 (arguing that when people move from a position 
of high discretion to a position of lower discretion, they become unhappy and frustrated at 
work). 
206 This was one of Utz’s principal findings in her comparison between Alameda and San 
Diego Counties in the 1970s.  See UTZ, supra note 20. 
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the legal environment to place greater or lesser weight on consistency of 
outcomes in the jurisdiction.  For instance, state sentencing laws applicable 
in Midway and Ring give broad sentencing discretion to each judge, while 
the sentencing laws applicable in Metro impose stricter guidelines on 
sentencing judges to promote statewide uniformity of outcomes.207  
Moreover, limited court capacity might impose conformist pressures even 
in offices that otherwise promote autonomy.  For example, if there is only 
one judge available to try all cases in the jurisdiction, that judge’s influence 
will feature prominently in the number of negotiated pleas brought forth by 
different prosecutors.208 
In light of these puzzles, we regret that we cannot test this second part 
of our theory with the data we have collected to date.  None of our research 
sites employs a charging or sentencing grid that prosecutors are supposed to 
follow, and none offered us access to their individual case files.  If we had 
such access, we could evaluate like cases (based on offense severity and the 
offender’s prior criminal record) in light of the prosecutorial decisions 
made: charges filed, bail recommendations, diversion eligibility, and all 
plea offers.209  Our ongoing research in additional jurisdictions will collect 
aggregate office outcomes and link that data to surveys asking individual 
prosecutors to characterize their own charging and case resolution choices 
based on general principles and on hypothetical cases.  This future work 
will allow us to test the theory that we have developed here regarding the 
relationship between office structures, professional identity, and 
consistency of case-handling decisions. 
B. OTHER EFFECTS ON OUTCOMES 
Beyond inspiring a particular level of consistency in case handling, an 
office’s social architecture and the correlative changes to attorneys’ 
professional identities might affect other individual or office outputs.  Our 
data suggest patterns in two spheres: career vision and relationship with 
local law enforcement. 
 
207 This is in accord with the findings of Mellon and his colleagues; jurisdictions 
governed by tight sentencing rules experienced more uniformity in prosecutorial case 
handling than jurisdictions that lacked such controls.  See Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 75 
(“Determinate sentencing, which is in effect in Indiana, greatly restricted the type of bargain 
that the court would accept relative to length of sentence.”). 
208 See Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 75–76 (describing the situation in Salt Lake City). 
209 Indeed, such case-level information is not accessible for Midway or Ring Counties, 
and only some of these categories would be available in Metro County.  For an example of a 
study based on a larger number of these variables than is typically available to researchers, 
see Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of. 
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 501 (1992). 
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Turning first to the career vision point, an office’s particular 
preference for hierarchy and experience can affect the line prosecutor’s 
sense of her own future as a professional.  An office that hires relatively 
junior attorneys and signals the expected career path through hierarchical 
organization is likely to promote and expect a future orientation among its 
prosecutors.  New arrivals picture themselves moving up within the office, 
and ask what steps today will carry them further along the path as growing 
professionals.  For example, the Metro prosecutors view their current 
activities as an investment in professional skills that will become more 
important as they gain seniority in the office.210  Chief among those skills is 
the ability to exercise judgment in a way that conforms to the judgment of 
their peers.211 
By contrast, veteran attorneys who work in offices that adopt flatter 
structures are more likely to take a more limited, present-oriented approach 
to the job.  Because there are no obvious promotional ladders to climb and 
fewer incentives to prove oneself as a rising star in an office such as Ring or 
Midway, attorneys seem more focused on managing their present positions 
than on trying to secure promotions.  While they do ponder potential career 
paths outside their current offices more frequently than the attorneys in 
Metro,212 they do not express anxiety about supervisors or senior peers 
evaluating them for possible star qualities or advancement within the 
office.213  Given that attorneys at later stages of their careers may be drawn 
to a flatter work environment,214 we cannot conclusively say that the office 
 
210 See HALL, supra note 60, at 48 (describing the career perspectives of newcomers who 
want to advance in an organization); Ibarra, supra note 17 (describing the upward orientation 
of new managers). 
211 See Felkenes, supra note 39, at 112 (“Adherence to [group values] arises as much out 
of the imitation of superiors as out of peer group conformity.  Conformity to this set of 
attitudes which are of utmost importance to the professional elders and of little importance to 
the public may guarantee career opportunity.”). 
 This future orientation of the prosecutors in Metro is in line with the office’s explicit 
cultivation of a long-term culture.  The Elected asks new hires for a commitment of three 
years of service (with some flexibility in individual cases) and seeks further commitments 
before sending an attorney to any major training program.  Additionally, the Elected aims to 
create an environment that remains attractive to prosecutors even after their first few years 
on the job, hoping to increase the number of attorneys who accept the necessary pay cut and 
remain in the office as experienced prosecutors.  Prosecutor 272. 
212 See, e.g., comments by Prosecutors 900, 905, 915, 950, 960, 965. 
213 One said she could do the job “with [her] eyes closed.”  Prosecutor 960; see also 
Prosecutor 900 (“[If] you’re still in misdemeanor prosecution after three plus years or after 
four plus years, there is some type of reason and it’s usually because you just choose not to 
be a felony prosecutor, that you’ve remained in a solicitor’s office.”). 
214 Particularly in Midway, many of our interviewees took their positions precisely 
because the lack of pressure for upward mobility would allow them to create a better balance 
between their careers and their families and other life responsibilities.  See Prosecutor 945 
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structure itself dampens their professional drive; it may simply reinforce 
what is already there. 
Another “output” that might be affected by an office’s social 
architecture and the prevailing professional identities of the attorneys who 
work there is the interaction between prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers.  A prosecutor works closely with law enforcement, but they are not 
in a direct hierarchical relationship.  In that context, where the prosecutor 
has to make tough choices about which cases to pursue and which to 
decline, she often has to assert authority in a face-to-face conversation with 
the arresting officer.  The key challenge is to earn respect from the police 
without taking cases that compromise ethical or efficiency standards of the 
office.  In the words of one of our respondents, the prosecutor has to be able 
to “sit across from an officer in the room and say, ‘I’m sorry’ . . . .  To have 
that dialogue, it’s a different skill set . . . .”215 
Managing these role conflicts is a challenge for inexperienced 
prosecutors, since they have yet to earn street credibility with officers or to 
develop confidence in their own screening abilities.216  As one attorney 
from the Drug Team in Metro put it, “That’s the one hard thing that I had to 
learn . . . .  Because I’m the type of person that I like everybody to like me.  
So of course if I’m rejecting [his] case and the officer doesn’t understand 
why . . . you’re not going to be their friend.”217  It can take years for a 
prosecutor, assigned to a single unit, to form relationships with police 
officers that are based on mutual respect and self-assurance, rather than on 
the need to be liked.  The Ring drug unit, for example, has maintained a 
consistent face for about a decade, and its prosecutors report that they have 
become like “family” with the officers on their cases.218  In this 
environment, Prosecutor 785 reports that he is regularly consulted before 
police actions are planned, and that his institutional knowledge of drug-
enforcement techniques provides him with a source of authority 
inexperienced prosecutors do not have.  Offices that provide prosecutors 
with long-term unit assignments rather than frequent rotations, and those 
 
(“Right now someone asked me that [‘What do you see for yourself in the future?’] like 
recently and I was just like, ‘You know, I’m just good.  I’m good right now, you know.’ 
Like I say, I have a 15-month-old that keeps me really busy.  And you know, I don’t know if 
she’s older if I’ll go back into private practice or not.  Right now I’m just really good with 
where I am and what I’m doing.”). 
215 Prosecutor 266 (explaining that the prosecutor’s challenge is to decline cases in a way 
that promotes dialogue with the police about how to improve investigations). 
216 This is in accord with the findings of Frederick and Stemen, who report that new 
prosecutors often feel less confident in their abilities to confront police officers or decline 
cases.  See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 58, at 11. 
217 Prosecutor 161. 
218 Prosecutor 735. 
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that employ cadres of veterans rather than newbies, thus seem more likely 
(than offices with contrasting features) to foster stable relationships 
between prosecutors and police.219  Our data reveal an interesting gender 
dimension to this relationship, too; female prosecutors report that, 
compared to their male colleagues, they feel less able to develop close and 
respectful ties with law enforcement officers.220 
Putting aside career vision and relationships to police, there are several 
other outcomes whose potential relationships to office structure and 
professional identity inspire us to speculate, in the absence of data.  For 
example, is there any correlation between office structure and the sheer 
volume of cases that prosecutors expect to handle?221  Economic theory 
suggests that offices that promote a team mentality of interchangeable 
attorneys could process more cases in certain high-volume settings, such as 
drug cases, property crimes, or low-level assaults.  On the other hand, office 
structures that promote autonomy among attorneys might take better 
advantage of specialized knowledge and overall could save time by not 
instituting cross-checking, “self-monitoring” procedures. 
We also might ask whether an office would respond differently to 
allegations of wrongful convictions if the employees worked in more 
hierarchical arrangements or were hired with more experience, as compared 
to other structural formations.  Either possibility is conceivable, but it seems 
equally likely that on questions dealing with single high-visibility cases, the 
personality and judgment of the Elected will determine the office response 
more directly than the office structure or the professional identity it helps to 
cultivate. 
Finally, one might ask whether particular office structures and specific 
professional identities lead some prosecutors to seek less severe outcomes 
for criminal defendants—a question that is distinct from our earlier question 
about the consistency of office outcomes.  Can a prosecutor’s office create a 
 
219 This is not to say that stability is always a positive value; “family”-type relationships 
with police officers may cause a prosecutor to lose his objectivity. 
220 See, e.g., Prosecutor 161 (stating that police officers “care about it, they worked on it, 
you know, and then I’m this, you know, little girl that’s sitting in the chair like, [uses high 
voice] ‘Oh yeah, that doesn’t look good,’ you know.”).  We explore the gender angle further 
in future work using this dataset.  
221 Prior scholars have shown a correlation between certain structures and office 
willingness to plea bargain, but that dependent variable would not get us very far here, since 
our three research sites all extensively engage in plea bargaining.  See, e.g., UTZ, supra note 
20; Mellon et al., supra note 25; Lief Hastings Carter, The Limits of Order: Uncertainty and 
Adaptation in a District Attorney’s Office 18–28 (Sept. 19, 1972) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with Doe Library, University of 
California, Berkeley).  Of course, as empirical tests of this theory take us (and others) to 
offices with different combinations of structures, it may be fruitful to test the correlation 
between office shape, hiring preference, and willingness to plea bargain. 
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“culture of mercy,” endorsing the idea that prosecutors should at times 
support the rehabilitation of defendants or endorse comparatively light 
sentences for deserving defendants?  Employees of all three offices profiled 
here express a strong commitment to doing justice in individual cases, a 
viewpoint that seems to embody a notion of relativism when it comes to 
punishment and to allow for mercy in appropriate cases.  But that view is 
far from universal.  We have recently spoken with prosecutors in offices 
with more severely hierarchical shapes than the three sites we examine in 
this Article, and some prosecutors in those offices told us that they are not 
personally responsible for rehabilitation or mercy; any lessening of the full 
weight of the criminal law as written, in their view, is the responsibility of 
the sentencing judge or some other actor.  Is this the result of steep 
hierarchy, the political style of the Elected, or some other architectural 
feature of the office?  We cannot be sure, but variation on this issue 
suggests that systematic research is needed to untangle the connections 
between architectural features, professional identity, and the severity of 
outcomes that an office actually produces. 
Questions such as these become relevant and testable once we 
spotlight the theoretical connections flowing from office structures to 
professional identities to prosecutors’ performance.  This research frontier 
is wide open. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Previous scholarly attempts to explain prosecutorial behavior have 
offered us limited views of how prosecutors understand their jobs and 
complete their work.  Some portrayals look only outward (toward external 
institutions that generally fail to sway prosecutorial behavior) and thus 
leave us pessimistic about the ability to control prosecutorial discretion.  
Others look only inward (toward the prosecutor’s individual conscience) 
and thereby try to reassure us that regulation by external sources is 
unnecessary. 
To understand more fully how the prosecutor experiences her 
professional role and the rule-of-law implications of that role, we must 
account for the institutional fabric of the office itself.  Our study has 
focused attention on two key features of that institutional fabric: 
organizational shape and hiring preference for experience. We have 
explored correlations between these two aspects of office architecture and a 
prosecutor’s professional identity.  One specific feature of the prosecutor’s 
professional identity—the development of an autonomous or team spirit—
does seem to correlate with the office environment.  Consistent with the 
sociological literature on organizations, we theorize and preliminarily find 
that attorneys who work in pyramidal offices and who are hired without 
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experience tend to embrace bureaucratic and group values to a much larger 
degree than their counterparts in other office environments. 
This team or autonomous conception of the prosecutor’s role has 
secondary linkages to a prosecutor’s sense of connection to the rest of the 
office, her relationship to other attorneys in the profession, her development 
of a career vision, and her relationships with police.  Prosecutors in the 
more traditional bureaucratic offices, who tend to be hired without 
experience into the lowest level of the organization, are quite nearsighted 
when it comes to their colleagues in other units in the office and prosecutors 
in other offices. They express relatively little interest in or connection to 
people outside their limited spheres, whether they be other prosecutors or 
police officers.  Yet when it comes to career vision, the bureaucratic 
prosecutors have it in spades—they regularly picture their futures in the 
office.  The experienced prosecutors in flat offices know a lot more about 
what their colleagues are doing and are more likely to have relationships 
with prosecutors in other offices and with local law enforcement.  But they 
have a more truncated sense of their career vision. 
Lastly, the team-versus-autonomy dimension of the professional 
identity might affect case-handling decisions.  That is, the more an office 
promotes consistency as a function of team spirit, the more likely its case 
outcomes will be consistent across prosecutors.  That being said, we do not 
expect this relationship to be a simple correlation, due to the influence of 
the criminal defense bar, the local judiciary, and the state legislative focus 
on reducing sentencing disparity. While we do not test the proposition in 
this Article, our theory points to a correlation between office structure, 
identity, and case handling that can be tested in the future.  Given the 
limitations of criminal justice information systems, a combination of 
statistical compilations and surveys of prosecutors will be necessary to 
measure any effects on case outcomes.  We expect to pursue multiple 
measures of outputs as this research progresses. 
Although our dataset in this first Article comprises only three offices, 
it does reveal new dimensions of the institution of prosecution.  First, 
contrary to a common scholarly assumption, prosecutor’s offices are not all 
hierarchical and specialized.  While this structure is likely characteristic of 
most large offices, when one considers all 2,300 state prosecutor’s offices 
in the United States, organizational shape runs from the flat to the steeply 
pyramidal.  Second, line prosecutors do not simply mimic the professional 
role that the Elected models for them, and prosecutors do not simply take 
on the character of the Elected.  The structural choices of a chief prosecutor 
affect and reinforce the professional identities of the line prosecutors in the 
office, independent of the example that the chief sets. 
Indeed, structural changes in the office environment can change the 
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professional role images at work there rather quickly.  In an epilogue to our 
field study, we note that two of the three offices (Metro and Midway) 
changed leadership in early 2011.  The new District Attorney in Metro kept 
most of the existing office structures in place, producing only minimal 
changes in attorney identities and performance.222  The new Solicitor 
General in Midway, in contrast, moved the office toward more 
specialization and midlevel supervision (a modestly more pyramidal shape), 
and prosecutor conceptions of their roles started shifting after a brief 
transition period.223 
Our exploration of office architecture and its correlation with 
professional identity finally breaks an impasse in scholarly treatments of 
prosecutorial discretion.  A close study of internal office structures, in all 
their varied forms, moves us past the dead-end observation that external 
constraints are anemic and inadequate to legitimize modern prosecutorial 
practices.  At the same time, a search for patterns in prosecutorial offices 
gets beyond the banal observation that every office is its own unique place, 
every prosecutor her own unique person.  Comparative institutional 
research, with the prosecutor’s office as the unit of analysis, opens up a new 
and generalizable body of knowledge.  It reveals to the managers of a 
prosecutor’s office just how profoundly they can shape the professional 
identities and outputs of their attorneys, based simply on their 
organizational choices.  Most importantly, this research gives the public 
(along with the journalists, academics, and other observers who serve as 




222 Interview with Elected and First Assistant of Metro County District Attorney’s Office 
(Oct. 11, 2011). 
223 Second Interview with Prosecutor 950 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
